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After the United Nations’ mission in Liberia (UNMIL) ends on September 30, 2015, 
effective policing will be a security concern for Liberians. Liberians have expressed fear 
that conflict could return if ongoing police training programs do not sustain public safety. 
The purpose of this mixed methods study was to understand how UNMIL’s training 
affected public confidence in the Liberia National Police (LNP). The theoretical bases for 
this study included public choice theory and liberal democratic theory.  Quantitative data 
were used to address impact of UNMIL’s police training on the maintenance of law and 
order. These data were collected through a researcher-developed survey which measured 
recruitment, training, effectiveness, and public confidence in the LNP. Participants were 
government officials, members of UNMIL, LNP, and civic organizations (n = 120). Data 
were analyzed using ANOVA. Qualitative semistructured interview data were also 
gathered from 18 additional participants to address the challenges for quality 
improvement in the police security forces. The results were inductively coded and 
organized across themes and patterns. Quantitative findings indicated a moderately 
significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and job effectiveness (r = -
0.35). However, qualitative findings show the government of Liberia failed to provide 
adequate resource support to complement the training due to its weak commitment.  
Diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions produced an outcome that 
lacked a country-specific context for Liberia. This study promotes positive social change 
by informing future police training interventions by the United Nations on a host 
county’s policing needs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
In the past 2 decades, the United Nations (UN) has increased its involvement in 
international security reforms through police training in countries transitioning to 
democracies. Zanotti (2004) stated, “Starting in the 1990s, the United Nations has 
increasingly been mandated to bring about international security by intervening in failing 
states through complex operations which include institutional reform projects” (p. 1). The 
UN Security Council has mandated more than 69 peacekeeping missions, including 
police assistance operations (Bayley, 2006; Franke & Warnecke, 2009).  
International police assistance to nations transitioning from conflict to state 
building is not a new phenomenon. To establish order and provide basic services in 
occupied Germany and Japan, postwar international police assistance programs were 
initiated by the United States following WWII. With the deployment of Ghanaian and 
Nigerian police contingents, international police assistance under a UN mandate first 
appeared in the Congo in 1960 (Bayley, 2006; Durch, 2010; Furuzawa, 2009). The UN 
peacekeeping and police reform interventions also occurred in Cyprus in 1964 and 
Namibia in 1989 (Krasno, 2004). The mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period 
and security challenges in re-establishing legitimate national authority in fragile states 
impelled the reintroduction of international police assistance as a component of 
postconflict peacekeeping. Because of the emphasis on respect for human rights and the 
rule of law, contemporary international police assistance and reform requirements are 




of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency in 
publicizing information on police operational activities, and responsiveness to the 
security needs of ordinary citizens (Bayley, 2006; Furuzawa, 2009).  
Postconflict peacekeeping and police reform initiatives have not always been 
successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs are often hampered by 
varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, and reluctance 
to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict security (Mobekk, 2001). 
Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) argued that some police reform programs fail or become 
less effective because the interventions fail to consider local political and social realities 
of the reform environment. In addition, the antagonistic relationships between the 
military, police, and other security institutions, punctuated by poor justice and 
correctional systems, impact peacekeeping and police reform initiatives (Zanotti, 2004). 
These issues pose challenges to postconflict international police reform interventions. 
Police reform has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping 
and state building operations (Furuzawa, 2009; O’Neill, 2005). Contemporary 
international police reform interventions are led by industrialized donor nations such as 
the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies. The 
overarching objectives of international police reform interventions are to build stable 
democratic regimes in postconflict fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to 
support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order 




For the citizens of Liberia, the fear of conflict recurring after the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) leaves makes the issue of effective policing one of their 
most pressing security concerns (Call & Wyeth, 2008; McDonough, 2008; Sawyer, 
2005). Liberia needs a well-trained, professional police force dedicated to upholding the 
rule of law and one trusted by the population. An effective police force capable of serving 
as an instrument for public safety and maintaining law and order is essential to 
sustainable statebuilding and democratic governance in Liberia (Alemika, 2009; 
Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 2005).  
In this study, I focused on the UNMIL’s police reform intervention activities 
during the period from 2004 through 2010. It was during this time that the organization 
recruited, trained, and deployed officers of the reorganized Liberian National Police 
Force. The manner in which the UNMIL’s police training has affected public safety, 
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police was 
investigated. 
Background of the Study 
On December 24, 1989, Liberia, the only country in Africa founded by freed 
slaves from the United States, plunged into one of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars. Internal 
political instability culminated in armed conflict between the government of Liberia and 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel opposition faction. In later years, 
other rebel opposition groups organized warring factions opposed to the NPFL. These 
factions included the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), United 




(LPC), Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement 
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL; Gadagbui, 2005). The armed conflict lasted 14 years 
(1989–2003) and brought death, destruction of life and property, and genocide. It is 
estimated that out of the nation’s population of 3.2 million, 250,000 thousand men, 
women, and children were killed and 1,000,000 were displaced (Jaye, 2008; Sawyer, 
2005). By the time the civil war ended in 2003, the nation had become a failed state 
(Kraxberger, 2007). 
The Liberian conflict became a concern for countries in the West African 
subregion, and later for the international community of nations. In order to bring an end 
to the civil war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
UN brokered a peace agreement that was signed between the warring factions in Accra, 
Ghana in 2003 (Adibe, 1997; Gadagbui, 2005; Saikal, 2000). The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 called for its implementation to be led by the UN.  
The UNMIL was established on September 19, 2003 by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1509. The mission was given the mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement, 
provide national security protection, and implement security sector reforms including 
restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security institutions in 
Liberia (Jaye, 2008). This included taking charge of organizing and rebuilding Liberia’s 
police force and other paramilitary security institutions until Liberian officers are judged 
capable of taking over and managing them. The UNMIL was set up and deployed in 
Liberia in 2003 (Muller & Sauvant, 2009). The UNMIL’s police training, restructuring 




Nations Police (UNPOL), which is also an integral component of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The UNPOL’s involvements in peacekeeping 
operations vary according to the mandate of the UN Security Council. In the case of 
Liberia, the Security Council Resolution also mandated the UNMIL: 
To assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and 
restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic 
policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise 
assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international 
organizations, and interested States. (Malan, 2008, p. 47)  
This provision of the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 provided the legal 
basis for the UNPOL’s operations. The UNPOL had authority to maintain law and order, 
provide security, and train and restructure the Liberia National Police. According to the 
UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Document (2006), the 
UNPOL was given additional responsibilities under the DPKO’s disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. These additional responsibilities 
included improving public confidence through controlling crime; maintaining law and 
order and security; and conducting police reforms through training, restructuring, and 
development of the national police. The DDR approach to postconflict policing and 
police reform focuses first on ensuring security through the maintenance of law and 




engaged in all aspects of police work and in the training and restructuring of the Liberia 
National Police (Malan, 2008).  
Liberia’s constitution affirms a centralized system of governance and public 
administration. The security sector legislation that created the police force in 1975 
provides for one centralized police force organization for the entire country, the LNP. 
The political subdivisions including municipalities do not operate any separate police 
systems. Candidates are recruited and trained at the National Police Academy located in 
Monrovia, the nation’s capital, before deployment throughout the country (Jaye, 2008). It 
was within this legal and political context that UNMIL operated in implementing its 
security sector reform programs.  
Problem Statement 
If the police training and reform programs currently underway do not sustain 
public safety and social stability, the country could regress and conflict could return. The 
UN Security Council Resolution 2190 (2014) extended the mission of the organization 
currently charged with peacekeeping and police reform in Liberia, UNMIL, to September 
30, 2015.  Policing issues such as inadequate responses, political suppression, corruption, 
and abuse of human rights before and during the civil war were central to the dynamics of 
the conflict in Liberia, and render a country-specific police reform strategy integral to 
sustainable democratic statebuilding (Kromah, 2007; Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 1992). 
The process of reform of police structures and administrative arrangements are also 
central to ensuring fair, effective democratic policing and sustainable impact on civil 




been successful (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). 
Against this backdrop, UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia provide an 
opportunity to assess how it has used international police reform standards to recruit, 
train, equip, and deploy the LNP force to effectively maintain law and order and gain 
public confidence.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the 
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP 
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The findings 
contributed to understanding the dynamics that influence training outcomes and inform 
stakeholders and decision makers about any possible changes that might be needed to 
improve police effectiveness and public confidence. The objective of this study was to 
identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an 
effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the citizens. The knowledge 
of the dynamics of a country-specific police reform program is useful for policymakers in 
Liberia and for the UN in planning and designing police reform programs for future 
postconflict states. 
Nature of the Study 
In this exploratory case study, I used a mixed methods approach to data collection 
and analysis. From the qualitative perspective, I reviewed documents and records and 
used open-ended and semistructured interview questions as primary sources of data 




numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement. I developed a questionnaire to 
evaluate police performance of graduates already working in the field and the public 
confidence of civil society. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for the research, 
objectives, and methods selected is presented in Chapter 3.  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is that it filled the gap in the literature on the impact 
of the UN’s training of the LNP. No earlier study exists on the impact of the UN’s police 
training on the effectiveness of the LNP to maintain law and order and gain public 
confidence in postconflict Liberia (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007; 
Olukoshi, 2008). The goal is to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective 
police force capable of maintaining law and order, and one trusted by the citizenry. In 
this study, I examined the effectiveness and results of international police training and 
reform interventions in the context of the Liberian situation. Despite various international 
police training and reform efforts in postconflict states in Africa, professional policing 
and citizens’ trust in the police forces remain elusive (Alemika, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008). 
Because international police reform in different postconflict situations reflects varying 
country-specific realities and experiences of each society, I sought to understand how 
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions affect the capacity of the LNP force to 
effectively and professionally carry out its duties, maintain law and order, and gain public 
confidence. I sought to understand the dynamics of UNMIL’s police reform efforts and to 
generate knowledge that will contribute to the establishment of an effective police force 




case study are important for planning and designing future police reform programs for 
postconflict police building. The study, therefore, has important social change 
implications such as the protection of human rights, crime reduction, a safer investment 
climate for businesses, economic growth, and social stability for Liberian government 
policy makers, for other governments in the community of nations, and for the UN in 
planning and designing police reform programs for future postconflict states. 
Research Questions 
The overarching research question that guided this investigation was the 
following: How has police training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected 
police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to 
maintain law and order? This question was expanded by two qualitative questions and 
one quantitative question. 
Qualitative 
Research Question 1: What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police 
training?  
Research Question 2: What reforms are required to improve the quality of 
policing and insure a reliable police security force in Liberia?  
Quantitative  
Research Question 3: What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training 
made relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s 




H01: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of 
law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force. 
H11: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law 
and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical frameworks that served as a foundation for this study were social 
contract theory, public choice theory, liberal democratic theory, and the theory of 
community policing. Social contract theory provides the rationale for the formation of 
civil society, considering that humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn 
by what they desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of 
life and property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to 
political authority or governments (Kathrani, 2010). Public choice theorists define police 
security as a public good in which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state 
to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing irrespective of their contribution (Stiglitz, 
2000). Liberal democratic theorists justify the necessity of an effective police force as it 
is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic 
processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to 
maintaining stability in a democracy (Mulcahy, 1998). Proponents of community policing 
theory emphasize the participation of local citizens for effective public safety. Increasing 
criminality and rising public protests against police forces around the world, as seen in 
the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in countries in 




policing training and practice in international police reform interventions. The traditional, 
reactive way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates 
and a lack of public confidence in the police (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999). The aim of 
the community policing is to approach policing more from a problem-solving perspective 
by building partnerships between the police and the population (Bayley, 1999; Pino & 
Wiatrowski, 2006).  
Assumptions 
 The study was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the 
participants who were selected for the study were knowledgeable about the subject 
matter. The second assumption was that the participants would be open in their 
discussions and that they would answer the interview questions truthfully and to the best 
of their knowledge and ability. Factors such as past police culture of withholding 
information, pressure from ranking officers, and political influence did not inhibit 
objective comments from participants. These assumptions were necessary to the extent 
that participants were public officials of the Liberian government and the leaders of 
community-based civil society organizations. They represented the population that was 
the intended beneficiary of the program. Other key informants were ranking officers of 
the LNP force and ranking members of UN mission in Liberia who were the key decision 
makers of the police reform program. 
Limitations 
There were three limitations of this study. The first limitation was that the study 




collection, analysis, and interpretation. My bias and subjectivity were recognized in the 
process. To minimize this possibility, I remained self-aware and conscious about the 
likelihood for bias and exercised neutrality at all times in the process (Creswell, 2007). 
The second limitation was that I used purposive sampling. Purposive sampling depends 
on the availability of respondents who are knowledgeable about the phenomenon under 
study. It should be noted that I worked on location in Liberia, was conversant with the 
local target population, and could make informed decisions about recruiting 
knowledgeable participants. During the course of the research, I discovered that ranking 
officers of the UNMIL, who participated in making key recruitment, training, and reform 
decisions, had left Liberia for missions in other countries and could not be contacted. 
UNPOL declined to participate in the study. The third limitation was that literature on 
postconflict police reform in Liberia is scant and limited in scope (Call & Wyeth, 2008; 
Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007). Although opinions about the Liberian police were obtained 
from government functionaries, civil society, and the citizenry at large, there exists little 
independent research data that can validate such opinions. The media have published 
various stories, reports, and articles on police reform challenges resulting in alleged 
ineffectiveness and a lack of professionalism of the LNP force. The incidents most 
frequently cited are rape, sexual violence, drugs, theft, extortion, and involvement in 
armed robberies (Nation Times 08/18/09:4; New Democrat 06/12/11:18; Daily Observer 
06/20/12:14; National Chronicle 07/11/12:18). The Government’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (2008) also cited widespread dissatisfaction with, and a lack of citizens’ trust in, 




the UN Secretary-General (2012) described the security situation in Liberia as “generally 
stable but fragile” and acknowledged the inability of the LNP to maintain law and order 
without the support of UNMIL (p. 8    ). However, there is limited independent research 
done specifically on the results of UNMIL’s police training and its impact on police 
effectiveness and public safety in Liberia. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Participants who were selected for this study resided on location in Monrovia, the 
capital city of Liberia. They fell in three categories. In the first category, I used 
homogenous purposive sampling of 18 actors and decision makers in the UNMIL’s 
reform program. In the second category, I used random sampling of 60 police officers 
who were trained and deployed by UNMIL and were active in the field. I also conducted 
a random sampling of 60 actors who were male and female leaders and members of 
community-based civil society organizations including the Federation of Liberian Youth, 
Institute for Research and Democratic Development, Liberia Marketing Association, 
New African Research and Development Agency, Action for Genuine Democratic 
Alternative, and the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Liberia. These 
key informants were individuals who had past and current knowledge of police behavior 
and practices in Liberia. This was a representative group of the population that was the 
targeted beneficiary of the reform program. I learned about their real life experiences, 
including their confidence in the new police force and the overall security reform 




Definition of Terms 
Conflict: As used in this study, the term refers to armed conflict characterized by 
civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic, cultural and political 
interests, or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent disagreements from 
perceived threats which trigger armed rebellion and war. The conflicts discussed in this 
study refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., army, police and paramilitary 
forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil wars in Africa were rooted in 
cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Wezeman, 1999; 
Sawyer, 2005). 
Democratic policing: As used herein, the concept embodies the idea that policing 
is a service with a primary focus more on protecting the human rights and security of the 
individual than the state. Democratic policing is the application of the law in a manner 
that is professional, impartial, and effective for the protection of all citizens regardless of 
their ethnicity, age, gender, political opinion, or religious belief (Bayley, 2001; Celador, 
2005; Mulcahy, 1998). 
International police: The term was used to refer to an organization of police 
officers representing various countries that are brought together to assist in providing law 
and order, public security, training, and stabilization in war-torn countries (Hume & 
Miklaucic, 2005; Krasno, 2004). 
Police: In this study the definition provided by Bayley (1999) was adopted. 
Bayley defined police as “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations 




apply physical force to affect behavior, including respecting the rights of others, 
preventing human rights abuses, and providing security for all is the distinguishing 
characteristic of the police. Bittner (as cited in Bayley, 1999) stated, “The policeman, and 
the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in 
which force may be used to meet it” (p. 8). 
Liberia National Police: In this study, the LNP refers to Liberia’s current police 
force trained and deployed by the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 
Postconflict: This term is used to describe the period following the cessation of 
hostilities. This period is characterized by the signing of a formal peace agreement by 
which the warring factions give consent and agree to end the conflict and commit 
themselves to the process of national reconstruction. The Geneva Center for Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (2009) described the postconflict environment as characterized 
by an unstable security situation which necessitates the provision of security as a priority 
for international actors. 
Police reform: For the purpose of this study, police reform refers to international 
response assistance to a nation’s police building program of which training is an integral 
component. A program of postconflict police security reform is a reflection of a 
dysfunctional police system and, therefore, the need for change and a clear break with the 
past. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2009) summarized 
the goals of police reform as prioritizing the equal protection of human rights as primary 




Statebuilding: In this study, the term is used to describe international efforts to 
strengthen weak postconflict states by rebuilding public institutions; fostering renewed 
sociocultural cohesion within a geopolitical boundary; and establishing a legitimate 
internationally recognized functioning central authority having the ability to provide 
security, maintain peace, enforce state laws, and maintain a minimum level of economic 
development to support democratic transition. The process also involves political 
collaborative efforts between local political elites and international actors to ensure that 
the outcomes are in accord with the norms of liberal democratic statehood (Dobbins et 
al., 2007; Miller, 2010). 
Stateness: In this study, the term is used to refer to a situation where, within a 
geopolitical boundary, there exists some level of sociocultural cohesion, and a legitimate 
functioning central authority has the ability to maintain peace and enforce state laws tp 
maintain minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition and 
is internationally recognized. The police are an embodiment of state authority and that 
stateness is as much a function of state authority as it is a function of effective policing 
(Dobbins et al., 2007; Kraxberger, 2007). 
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL:). The UNMIL was set up and 
deployed in Liberia in 2003 under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1509. 
The mandate authorized UNMIL to maintain law and order, provide security, train, and 




Summary and Outline of the Study 
Liberia was a fragile state in transition from a protracted civil war to peace and 
democratization with assistance from the UN and the international community at large. A 
critical component of this statebuilding process was security sector reform with a focus 
on police building. Liberia needed an effective police force capable of serving as an 
instrument for the protection of human rights, public safety, and the maintenance of law 
and order.  
This study comprises five chapters. In Chapter 1 of the study, I presented an 
overview of the research problem, the background of the study, including the increasing 
role of the UN in responding to international crises. I discussed the purpose and 
significance of the study. I also posed questions about the UNMIL’s police training and 
public safety reform interventions that have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous 
works. In Chapter 2, I position the study within a broader contemporary scholarly context 
on the subject of international postconflict police reform. I review scholarly literature that 
is relevant to security sector reform and the UN interventions in postconflict police-
building. The international state building interventions in the last 2 decades have had 
more challenges and setbacks than successes, as security and peace remain elusive. Both 
local and international actors are in search of policy options. In this chapter, I provide an 
overview of the conceptual basis of international interventions in police reform in post 
conflict countries and the accomplishments, challenges, and dilemmas associated with 
these reform efforts. The history of the Liberian police force and its operations before and 




demonstrate their similarity to police reform activities in Liberia. I also discuss the 
rationale for police security reform as a prerequisite to sustainable statebuilding and 
democratization. I compare and contrast the views of scholars on the outcomes of various 
statebuilding initiatives undertaken in the last decade. The theories of social contract, 
liberal democracy, public choice and democratic policing, and community policing are 
discussed. The perspectives of international public policy practitioners on statebuilding 
interventions as a means of persuading weak states to abide by the norms of stateness 
were presented.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss and examine the theoretical methods of inquiry that 
grounds the research. The detailed discussion on the research design used in the study 
include the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research sample and population, method of 
data collection and procedures, data analysis and issues of quality and ethical 
considerations, the researcher’s role, and participants’ protection. The independent 
variable in this study was the UNMIL’s reform training strategy. The UNMIL’s training 
served as an indicator of whether or not the police was well-trained or poorly trained. 
Factors considered included effective policing, issues of ethics, and police behavior. I 
used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of 
the Liberian police. Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and 
during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I did multiple year 
comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time 
the UNMIL deployed trained police officers. The other intervening variables that are 




public confidence in, the LNP. The dependent variable in this study was the outcome of 
the training. This outcome was measured against the UNMIL’s reform mandate and 
standards of recruitment, training, and deployment strategies employed considering the 
context of the country-specific situation of Liberia. The dependent variables for this study 
also included citizens’ confidence. I measured citizens’ confidence in the reformed police 
force. Hypotheses were developed to test citizens’ confidence. In Chapter 4, I analyzed 
the data and presented the findings of the study. The data analysis include a summary of 
the data instruments, a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of 
participants, and the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views, 
and responses that answered the research questions.  In Chapter 5, I presented the 
conclusions and recommendations of the study based on my findings and the critical 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the literature that is relevant to the study. The goal was to 
synthesize the literature on international police reform in the context of international 
statebuilding interventions in postconflict states. The chapter is organized into four 
sections. In the first section, I discuss the dynamics of postconflict statebuilding, 
including the roles, responsibilities, and challenges facing the UN. In the second section, 
I define police reform and provide a conceptual basis of police reform for democratic 
governance in the context of states undergoing transitions from conflict to 
democratization. An historical background of the LNP is presented. The behavior of the 
police and citizens’ perception of it as an instrument of repression and terror before and 
during the conflict is discussed. In the third section, I review police reform tools and 
research works on international police reform interventions with selected cases as 
illustrations. In the fourth section, I provide a summary of the chapter highlighting the 
theoretical framework and strategies of international statebuilding through police security 
reform.  
The strategy that I used in searching the literature included using literature 
relevant to postconflict international police reform. I used the Walden University library 
and other libraries of local universities both in the United States and Liberia. I used 
Academic Search Premier and Business Search Premier, ProQuest Dissertations, and 




Liberia, including websites of government ministries and agencies in Liberia. I used 
books and articles published within the last 5 years.  
Policing Statebuilding: International Interventions  
UN peacekeeping interventions, including police reform assistance operations, 
have increased in the post-Cold War period. The UN Security Council has mandated 
more than 69 peacekeeping and statebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War to 
help strengthen fragile states to transition from conflict to reform and democratization in 
countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, and Sudan (Durch, 2010; Franke & Warnecke, 2009). There have been more than 
100 armed conflicts around the world since 1989. More nations around the world 
continue to endure civil unrest characterized by confrontations between police and 
citizens and culminating in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In 2011 for example, 
scenes of demonstrators clashing with police became the defining images of ongoing 
insurgencies in Arab nations such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen (West, 
2011). The “Arab Spring” signaled the relevance of international police reform 
intervention and how it has become a critical standard for the protection of human rights, 
upholding the rule of law, and improving government-citizen relations in the global 
context. A well-trained police force can promote postconflict democratization and 
societal stability (West, 2011).  
The term conflict as used in this study refers to insurgencies and armed conflict 
characterized by civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic, 




disagreements from perceived threats, which ultimately trigger armed rebellion and war. 
Most of the conflicts discussed herein refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., 
army, police, and paramilitary forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil 
wars in Africa were rooted in cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & 
Wyeth, 2008; Sawyer, 2005; Wezeman, 1999). In 1995, 14 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa were emerging from complex political emergencies or conflicts and were facing 
challenges of postconflict statebuilding and democratization (Green & Ahmed, 1999). 
The term statebuilding as used in this study refers to international efforts that enabled 
fragile states to build capacity, reconstruct their institutions, and regain stateness and the 
authority to govern effectively in the delivery of public goods and services. Miller (2010) 
said, “International statebuilding is thus an attempt to spread norms about what states are, 
what they should be, and how states govern; it is an attempt by great powers to compel 
weak states to abide by norms of statehood” (p. 6). In the process, however, police reform 
has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping and statebuilding 
interventions (Furuzawa, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).  
Contemporary international police reform assistance led by the UN and 
industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other 
Western liberal democracies has occurred largely in postconflict settings. The 
overarching objectives of international police reform interventions in postconflict 
situations are to build stable democratic regimes in fragile states and to secure conditions 
necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world 




reform postconflict police organizations and enhance their effectiveness often involves 
varying perspectives and alternative approaches to police reform. Call (2003) identified 
five alternative perspectives that bear on how local policy makers, the UN, and other 
donor partners determine priority areas in the police reform process under specific 
country conditions: (a) human rights perspective, (b) peacekeeping/military perspective, 
(c) law enforcement perspective, (d) economic development perspective, and (e) 
democratization perspective. The human rights perspective focuses on police behavior in 
the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators 
from the ranks of the police and the military (Call, 2003). The peacekeeping/military 
perspective emphasizes the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of any 
possible return to conflict, especially in the periods that immediately follow the cessation 
of hostilities and periods of peacebuilding (Call, 2003). The law enforcement perspective 
emphasizes local crime control and professional policing with a focus on the protection 
of human rights and facilitating the processes of democratization (Call, 2003). The 
economic development perspective supports disarmament and demobilization and favors 
police reform efforts through broad security sector reforms (Call, 2003). This perspective 
also reflects interest in removing impediments to foreign investment and enhancing 
peaceful environment for overall economic development. The democratization 
perspective emphasizes adherence to the rule of law, justice, and overall security as the 
basis for fostering institutional development. This perspective also emphasizes economic 
rationale for police reform in the broader context of a linkage between security, economic 




There are many challenges that confront national decision makers, the UN, and 
other donor partners in international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski 
(2006) argued that most of the international police training strategies offered to 
postconflict and developing countries by Western democracies prove less effective 
because they do not adequately address issues such as conflict resolution, importance of 
citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human rights, and citizens’ engagement in 
crime control strategies. Call (2003) also described other challenges or tensions. The first 
challenge is that police reform often takes place exclusive of other auxiliary institutions. 
Call (2003) underscored that if a police reform program is to be successful; it must be 
holistic and must consider building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the 
justice system that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. These 
institutions include the courts, prosecutors, and civil society organizations that advocate 
accountability of the government. Another challenge is that international police reform is 
relatively new and there are fewer credible models of policing (Bayley, 2006). This 
creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local realities, such as culture and 
political realities. Reformers also tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own 
models of policing, or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere. The 
goal must be to ensure local ownership of the reform program. Furuzawa (2009) argued 
that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be 
based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. Pino and Wiatrowski 
(2006) recommended that police training programs must be implemented in ways that 




standards embedded in democratic principles while tailoring their reforms to their own 
socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9). A third challenge identified by Call is the 
difficulty in promoting merit-based recruitment in the reform process. While merit-based 
criteria serve as the best yardstick for recruitment, the process of recruitment have often 
involved pressure from local decision makers to cater to the interests of particular 
political or ethnic groups outside of merit. Call argued that police reform programs 
should seek to exclude those who have committed human rights abuses or violated 
international laws irrespective of such special interests. The challenge here is that the lack 
of records resulting from the conflict can result in unintended recruitment of abusers 
(Call, 2003).   
The overarching goal of international police training to ensure the effectiveness of 
postconflict police forces is to help fragile states to regain their stateness (Kraxberger, 
2007). Stateness is defined as a situation where there exists within a geopolitical 
boundary, some level of sociocultural cohesion and legitimate functioning central 
authority having the ability to maintain peace, enforce state laws, maintain minimum 
level of economic development to support democratic transition, and is internationally 
recognized (Kraxberger, 2007). Stateness is also a function of security and a condition 
under the social contract theory. Hansen (2000) stated that “security is the key to a ‘new 
social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the 
population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into 
government hands” (p. 35). Social contract theory provides a rationale for the formation 




desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of life and 
property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to political 
authority or governments. It is from this social contract theory perspective that the state 
must develop and strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social 
contract and deliver security protection and such other public goods to the citizenry 
(Kathrani, 2010; Kraxberger, 2007; Miller, 2010).  
The concept of stateness implies that there has existed a situation where a state 
has collapsed, and where state structures and legitimate authority for maintaining law and 
order have disintegrated. Contemporary literature on stateness also infer various 
perspectives of the state, such as weak, strong, failed or failing states depending on the 
particular circumstances and conditions of the given geopolitical boundary. Stateness is 
as much a function of authority as it is a function of effective policing. Effective policing 
is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and 
sustainable (Ellison, 2007; Green & Ahmed, 1999; Olukoshi, 2008). Peace and 
socioeconomic and political stability are cardinal to liberal democracy, which also places 
a premium on the protection of individual liberties and rights including the rights of 
minorities. Liberal democratic theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as 
it is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic 
processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to 
maintaining stability in democratic political systems. A police force is a representation of 
state authority. The citizens should look up to the state and therefore to the police to 




also with a sense of security, and to “provide protection for the social and political 
processes that are critical to democracy” such as free and fair elections (Mulcahy, 1998, 
p. 33). Police and “stateness” for a transitioning liberal democracy such as Liberia, are 
also tied together from the perspective of public choice theory.  
Public choice theory considers the state or government as an agent and its 
institutions and policies as public goods (Stiglitz, 2000; Mulcahy, 1998; Kraxberger, 
2007). A police force is, therefore, a public good to the extent that it is an embodiment of 
state authority. Public choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public 
good which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their 
protection and wellbeing, irrespective of their individual contribution (Stiglitz, 2000). An 
effective police force is one that is effective and efficient in performing its mission of 
providing security, safety, and justice to all citizens. Police failure or lack of effectiveness 
reflects on the broader issues of national security and political stability. This is why states 
transitioning from protracted internal conflicts are haunted by the well-founded fear that 
police failure makes the state susceptible to the kind of crises that has the potential to 
escalate into a total breakdown of law and order, sociopolitical instability, and a dreaded 
return to conflict (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Sawyer (2007) argued that “The 
postconflict state must be a different type of state if it is to meet new challenges. It must 
be capable, responsive and participatory” (p. 22).  
Community policing theory emphasizes participation from local citizens for 
effective public safety. By the 1970s, police administrators, especially in the United 




eroded the citizens’ sense of community and concern for one’s neighbors (Kappler & 
Gaines, 2012). Moreover, people were becoming estranged from their police because 
they feared the police and criminals alike. They no longer trusted the police enough to get 
involved in reporting criminals in their neighborhoods. Community policing therefore 
evolved from the theory that a grateful public will gladly provide needed information and 
assistance to the police in contrast to one of an adversarial approach. Therefore, 
harnessing collaboration from law-abiding citizens in their neighborhoods was also 
critical to long-term sustainable change and peace-building (Kappler & Gaines, 2012). 
Trojanwicz and Bucqueroux (1998) defined community policing: 
Community policing is a philosophy and an organizational strategy that 
promotes a new partnership between people and their police. It is based on 
the premise that both the police and the community must work together as 
equal partners to identify, prioritize and solve contemporary problems 
such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and 
overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality 
of life in the area. (p. 8) 
Increasing criminality, and rising public protests against police forces around the 
world, as seen in the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in 
countries in transition from conflict to democratization (West, 2011), all signal the need 
for including community policing training and practice in international police reform 
interventions. The rationale for this new way of policing is that the traditional, reactive 




of public confidence in the police. The aim of community policing is to approach 
policing more from a problem-solving perspective by building partnerships between the 
police and the population (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999; Kappler & Gaines, 2012). 
Baker (2006) also argued for example, that the Government of Sierra Leone may have to 
harness community policing groups because despite achievements in the country’s police 
reform program, delivering effective police services in most parts of the country remains 
a significant challenge for the government. In Liberia, the relevance of community 
policing to UNMIL’s police reform intervention and to policing practices was 
acknowledged in the Government of Liberia’s social and economic development plan 
referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008): 
Given that the history of police-citizen relationships is one characterized 
by fear and mistrust, a new emphasis on involving local communities and 
adoption of more citizen-friendly policing methods will improve police-
citizen relationships. The LNP and other security agencies will formulate 
policies to reduce the incidence of corruption, police brutality, and other 
ethical violations. (p. 54)  
The PRS also recognized the need to train the police to cooperate with local governments 
through district-level security committees in order to improve human and economic 
security.  
Defining and Conceptualizing Police Reform 
Police reform as used herein refers to international response assistance to a 




police force from bottom-up under conditions of total collapse resulting from violent 
internal conflict (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Sinclair, 2007; Labonte, 2003). Police 
reform is also used to describe international efforts to achieve sustainable postconflict 
public safety and maintain fairness in the operational behavior of local police through 
rebuilding police capacity and restructuring police institutions. The process involves 
providing institutional support that focuses on transformational activities including 
mentoring, vetting, training and rebuilding services, providing operational security and 
support and establishing new structures of public policing to help the local force break 
away from its past (Baker, 2006; Bayley, 2001). Contemporary international police 
reform requirements are different from those of the Cold War era because of its emphasis 
on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Police reform advocates stress the 
importance of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency 
in publicizing information on police operational activities and responsiveness to the 
security needs of ordinary citizens (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009). Police reform has 
become recognized as a critical and essential prerequisite for successful postconflict 
peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in states that are transitioning from 
complex political emergencies or conflicts to regain their stateness (Celador, 2005; 
Furuzawa, 2009). The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions 
led by industrialized donor nations are to build stable democratic regimes in postconflict 
fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging 





Postconflict international police reform initiatives have not always been 
successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs have often been 
hampered by varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, 
and reluctance reform missions to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict 
security. These issues often pose enormous challenges to postconflict international police 
reform interventions (Ellison, 2007). Durch (2010) noted: 
Summarizing the 1990s record in UN “Policekeeping,” one might say that 
great ambitions were not matched by great strategies, great competence, or 
great success. Mandate drafters seemed to assume that the presence or 
moral authority of UN police would be adequate to stabilize post-war 
public security or to tame war-tainted police forces; these presumptions 
were invalidated nearly every time they were put to the test. (p. 7)  
In the case of Haiti for instance, the UN police reform interventions through 
training and institutional restructuring of the Haitian National Police (HNP) produced 
less successful outcomes for periods that followed the interventions when measured 
against crime rates (Ho, 2006). Crimes against the person (i.e., murder and sexual assault 
of teen age girls) increased, and some of these crimes were committed by some members 
of the police and other security forces (Ho, 2006; Mobekk, 2001). Despite successive UN 
missions in the 1990s, reformers in Haiti failed to focus on taking factors such as local 
policing traditions, and country-specific sociopolitical realities into account. The 




poor justice and correctional systems impacted negatively on UN police reform initiatives 
(Cockayne, 2009; Zanotti, 2004).  
Several researchers have written about postconflict statebuilding and police 
reform similar to the UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia. These researchers 
include Baker (2008), Bayley (2006), Durch (2010), Ellison (2007), Furuzawa (2009), 
Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007), Jones (2008), Kraxberger (2007), Labonte (2003), 
McDonough (2008), and Miller (2010).  One such study which is relevant to the Liberian 
situation was a case study conducted by Glebbeek (2001) on police reform program in 
Guatemala. The study examined the strategy applied in the recruitment and training of 
aspirants. In that police reform program, members of the old police forces were 
deactivated and the old police institution was abolished to establish the new National 
Civil Police force. Glebbeek (2001) concluded that the process had not succeeded and 
faced significant challenges on account of the recruitment decisions. In contrast, a similar 
police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El Salvador found that the 
strategy for building a new police force from the bottom-up was successful because it 
provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by the inclusion of some 
members of the old military-controlled police. It also included members of armed 
factions, although it was significantly dominated by recruits from the civilian population 
who had had no record of involvement in the armed conflict. The two case studies on El 
Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate sharp similarities to the security sector reform 




Another notable study was done by Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) focusing on 
police building in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The authors examined police 
building in the context of peace building and state building. They focused on two case 
studies in arguing that despite its importance to the restoration of law and order, police 
building has been a relatively neglected dimension of post-war peace building in 
international police security reform programs, and that this neglect is primary the cause 
of failures in reforming police institutions especially in postconflict states. Emerging 
literature on effective international postconflict police reform emphasizes participation 
and ownership of reform programs by local stakeholders. The authors’ conclusions were 
critical to understanding the challenges of the UNMIL’s security sector reform initiatives 
in Liberia. In his essay on peace and stability in states transitioning from conflict to 
democratization, McDonough (2008) argued that despite years of statebuilding 
interventions by the international community, postconflict stability remains an elusive 
goal for many African nations such as Liberia. This is so because the socioeconomic and 
political conditions that culminated in protracted civil wars still prevail to date, and these 
conditions are the primary factors that continue to frustrate regional and international 
efforts at peace building. Attempts at mitigating these conditions do not by themselves 
play any determining role in the success or failure of statebuilding efforts. 
McDonough(2008) recommended that sustainable conflict resolution is possible only in 
the presence of peace building efforts that deal significantly with those socioeconomic 




A program of postconflict police security reform is often a reflection of a 
dysfunctional police system which creates the need for change, and a clear break with the 
past. Jones (2007) argued that implementing change in police institutions have often been 
unsuccessful due to the failure of the administrators or the agents of change to understand 
or appreciate the organizational environments in which they operate. Jones (2007) 
explained this failure from the perspective of the theory of complex adaptive systems. 
Jones (2007) argued that administrative systems that succeed are systems that adapt to 
new realities and conditions.  Olson (2007) provides an overview of an organization 
theory-based approach to the study of public administrative behavior, institutions, and 
developments within the context of democratic governance. Administration takes place in 
an environment of diversified structures and social relationships. Activities are organized 
around well-defined boundaries, rules, and practices. Olson (2007) argued that in the 
context of globalization, the ideal public administrator is one who advocates the 
emerging view in public policy that supports participatory forms of decision-making. The 
points raised by Olson (2007), and Jones (2007) about understanding and managing 
change bears strong similarity to this study in the context of interventions by international 
actors in police reform programs such as those in the UNMIL. Implementing change with 
assumptions that are nested in some international police reform template has the potential 
to pose challenges. Atkinson (2008) argued that while liberal intervention in Liberia has 
contributed to the process of peace building, the “deficiencies of the intervention” such as 
insufficient commitment from the government and the international partners, continue to 




activities spearheaded by the United Nations and other international nongovernmental 
organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) acknowledged that part of the implementation 
challenges are due to problems emanating from resource constraints. However, Sawyer 
(2005) emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of various reform 
programs are lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, and 
the lack of effective coordination amongst implementing agencies and their failure to 
engage Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs.  
The liberal democratic theory on establishing an effective police force is that as 
an embodiment of state authority, an effective police force strengthens democracy by 
making society safer. A successful police reform program will enhance state authority, 
make the society safer, and strengthen democracy in Liberia. Effective policing is a 
benefit of liberal democracy because it protects freedoms, rights, and happiness such as 
enjoyment of enhanced public safety as a public good (Stiglitz, 2000). Postconflict police 
reform is more critical to and definitive of democracy. It is central to democratic self-
governance defined as the process of governing that involves both government and 
citizen stakeholders working together as equal participants in finding solutions to public 
problems such as police security reform (Zanotti, 2004). A strategy for postconflict police 
reform ought not only to be directed at improving performance effectiveness or 
delivering better services, but the strategy should also focus on a process of regaining 
legitimacy from the citizenry. This is also why the liberal democratic model of policing 
maintains that policing should be practiced in the context of community consent 




enforces and protectors of peace. It is from this liberal democratic view of policing that 
concepts such as police-community relations and community policing emerged as central 
to quality public safety (Mulcahy, 1998). 
The Liberia National Police: An Historical Background 
Understanding the history of the Liberia National Police (LNP) and its 
organizational culture is critical to implementation of a successful police reform program 
design. Until it was legally established in 1924, policing functions in Liberia were 
performed by the Liberia Frontier Force (LFF). The LFF was a military defense force that 
was set up by the government with the mission primarily to patrol and protect Liberia’s 
borders. In time, it became an integral part of the central administration of the hinterland 
and its functions were expanded to include protection for government officials, forced 
recruitment of unpaid laborers for public and private works, and enforcement of tax 
collection in the hinterland. The LFF was undisciplined, corrupt, and notorious for its 
brutal methods of tax collection (Liebenow, 1969; Sawyer, 1992). In 1924, the 
Legislature passed an act establishing the first police force in Liberia. It was a small 15-
man police force known as the Monrovia City Police with a mission limited to protecting 
life and property in Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. In time, the numerical strength 
of the force increased from 400 in 1965 to more than 1000 in 1971. In 1975, rising urban 
and rural population, crime, and increasing political and national security concerns 
caused the Legislature to amend the original police act and officially establish the 




law enforcement duties with police detachments deployed throughout the country (Jaye, 
2008; Sawyer, 1992).  
The fundamental duty of any police force in a state is to ensure the security of the 
citizens and their property. The security of citizens also means protection of human 
rights, prevention of crime, and the detection of crime for the purposes of prosecuting 
those who violate the social contract (Bayley, 2001; Furuzawa, 2009). In contrast, the 
Liberia National Police had a long history of bias, corruption, intimidation, suppression, 
and brutality. The LNP behaved in similar manner as did the Liberia Frontier Force 
before it. From the outset of its formation, the Liberia National Police Force was largely a 
dysfunctional institution that catered more to serving the social, economic, and political 
interests of the wealthy and those with political power while it provided little protection 
for the majority of the citizens. Prior to the civil war, the LNP was also perceived by the 
citizenry to be one of the most corrupt government institutions in the country. The most 
notorious bribe takers were the traffic police, investigators, officers on patrols, officers at 
traffic check points or road blocks, and officers at report desks (Olukoshi, 2008; Opolot, 
2008). The LNP also operated more as agents of state security, insofar as the “state” was 
defined as the government in power (Sawyer, 1992; Liebenow, 1987). By 1970, the 
security network in Liberia comprised the Liberia National Police (LNP), and a host of 
secret police networks including the Special Security Service (SSS), National Bureau of 
Investigation (NBI), Executive Action Bureau (EAB) and the National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) (Sawyer, 1992). From the 1950s onward, the Liberia police was 




governments and military dictatorships. It carried out countless cases of arbitrary arrests, 
detention and torture of students, civil servants, and the murder of members of the 
political opposition. By the onset of the civil war in 1989, police brutality had deepened 
as some members became part of the government’s secret death squads. Sawyer (1992)  
described the use of police force for political repression in Liberia: 
By the time of Tubman’s death in 1971, the security network was in 
virtual control of Liberia. At least three celebrated treason trials had been 
held. In addition, countless instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and 
torture of students, civil servants, and others had taken place under a 
veritable reign of terror as suspicion and fear gripped the society. (p. 282) 
According to Sawyer (2005), the LNP intimidated and suppressed ordinary citizens and 
political opposition leaders to protect the regime during the war. The LNP became 
politically biased, militarized, and ethnically divided. Many officers of the LNP 
arbitrarily committed human rights abuses and participated in atrocities committed 
against unarmed citizens. In its strategy for consolidating peace and security, the 
Government of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) acknowledged that: 
Security in Liberia has been a major concern since independence. Security 
forces have been used to intimidate and at times to terrorize the population 
and intervene in the political process without respect for the due process of 
law. The security forces contributed to a system in which economic 
benefits and political power accrued to the elite, leaving the majority of 




Sawyer (2005) argued that past political leaders in Liberia did not value the primary 
mission of the police. The mission, to protect the social practices and political processes 
that make society safer, included protection of human rights, freedoms, happiness, and 
free and fair elections, all of which are critical to strengthening democracy.  
Acccording to Kromah (2007) the lack of appreciation of the importance of the 
police was reflected in recruitment processes, training, and conditions of work and 
promotion practices during the period leading to the civil war. The feeder class of recruits 
was from amongst the poverty stricken, demoralized population comprising elementary 
and junior high school dropouts mainly from urban neighborhoods. The recruitment 
processes and promotion were characterized by a culture of bribery, nepotism. Training 
programs placed little emphasis on lessons in policing ethics, accountability, and linking 
the protection of life and property to basic human rights and rule of law values (Dunn & 
Tarr, 1988; Liebenow, 1987; Kromah, 2007). Officers deployed were poorly paid 
compared to other civil servants. They had no benefits, and no housing allowances. They 
were underfunded and poorly equipped. They regularly transported themselves in 
commercial vehicles to their assignment stations. All of these factors impacted on the 
operations of the Liberian police. Throughought the history of the LNP, policing issues 
have revolved around the lack of professionalism, low morale, corruption, and extortion 
as officers harassed civilians to augment their meager wages (Olukoshi, 2008). These 
conditions also left the society under secured and made police service unattractive to 
qualified high school and college graduates. Throughout its history, the LNP has been 




2003, the country’s police system had lost all credibility as a legitimate organization for 
public safety and had collapsed. This all accounted for why policing issues were central 
to the dynamics of the conflict and why any postconflict security interventions in Liberia 
required radical reformation of the police institution, police forces, and their conduct.  
In the postconflict context, sustainable statebuilding and socioeconomic 
development depend to a large extent on building a police force that can break away from 
its discredited past history of corruption, bias, intimidation, and brutality. UNMIL’s 
police training process is taking place in a new global environment under country-
specific realities and conditions that inform how training intervention for the LNP must 
happen in order to ensure sustainability and ownership.  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra, 
Ghana called for security sector reforms to build and maintain effective national security 
institutions based on the rule of law, including the restructuring of the LNP. The focus on 
police reform was to develop a professional police force that is effective and capable to 
protect and serve the citizenry, build safe communities by respecting their human rights, 
and responding to crime, corruption, and abuse (Jaye, 2008). Given the tragic history of 
the LNP, the issue of how best to restructure the police organization and its operations 
and move it away from undue political influence has been a central concern of ordinary 
citizens and government leaders in the postconflict democratization process. The 
lingering questions are what an effective police force is and what type of police security 
force is appropriate to meet the needs of the people of Liberia. How should the LNP be 




The evolving debate appeared to favor the view that police accountability to citizens is 
central to public order and to effective policing (Fayemi, 2004; Sawyer, 2005). The 
national debate called for a kind of community policing in which local people actively 
participate in providing police protection. Sawyer (2005) recommended that the local 
people must actively participate as co-producers of their own security protection but in 
ways that do not militarize their communities. In 2008, Liberia’s social and economic 
development plan referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) upheld that:  
The LNP will be the primary operational agency responsible for internal 
security and will be restructured to ensure greater effectiveness and 
efficiency. In particular, the LNP will reassess its recruitment and vetting 
practices, before being expanded to address shortages of personnel across 
the country. They will be better trained to address personal crime, to 
reduce incidents of corruption, and police harassment and to strengthen 
the confidence of local communities in the police. (p. 52) 
Postconflict Police Reform in Liberia 
 
 The United Nations police reform program in Liberia (2003-2011) was 
implemented through the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) forces under the 
direction of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNCIVPOL’s police-
building and peacekeeping experiences were rooted in UN peacekeeping mandates 
implemented in previous postconflict states such as East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands (Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006).  




Nations Police (UNPOL) the organization’s mission in Liberia was similar to those of its 
previous missions: restore law and order, and provide security and public safety for all 
persons regardless of their ethnicity; train, restructure, and strengthen the local police to 
ensure its capability to uphold the rule of law and operate effectively in accordance with 
international policing standards, and the principles of democratic policing including 
respect  for human rights (Kumar, 2010; Mobekk, 2001). By the time UNPOL arrived in 
late 2003, policing in Liberia had long collapsed and the country was without any 
effective rule of law. Police stations had been plundered, destroyed, and abandoned. The 
remnants were controlled by rebel factions who also manned roadblocks. In rural Liberia, 
informal policing functions were performed by intrusive individuals who called 
themselves “police volunteers” but were neither recruited by the interim National 
Transitional Government of Liberia, nor approved by their local communities (Jaye, 
2008; Friedman, 2011). 
 UNMIL’s police reform strategy began in 2003 with the establishment of a group 
that was responsible to make key police reform decisions. This group comprised ranking 
officers of UNPOL and ranking Liberian police leaders of the then interim National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). This group organized the Rule of Law 
Implementation Committee which jointly guided the implementation of the police reform 
program. Members of the committee were comprised of ranking officers of UNMIL and 
ranking police leaders and officials of the government. It included the UNMIL Police 
Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Security, and the interim 




to restore law and order. According to the UN Secretary General’s Report to the UN 
Security Council (2004), UNPOL and Liberian police leaders established a local police 
presence in early 2004. They recruited, vetted, and deployed an initial interim force of 
400 former local police officers to work alongside UNPOL in its efforts to drive out 
former combatants and reclaim police stations in Monrovia. They also implemented 
“quick impact” projects which included the reopening of police sub-stations, taking over 
roadblocks, and constructing new mini-stations (Friedman, 2011).  
Recruitment and Vetting 
 According to Friedman (2011) the next strategy of the Rule of Law 
Implementation Committee was to decide on the number of police officers to be trained 
both in the context of the population of the country and the long term funding capacity of 
the government to maintain the new Liberia National Police in the long term. Based on 
UN police standards, the Committee recommended that the target size of the new Liberia 
National Police would be 3,500 officers by the year 2007. That would amount to a police-
citizen ratio of about 1 police officer per 1,000 citizens given an anticipated population of 
about 3.6 million when a national population census is conducted in 2008 (UN Security 
Council S/2007/479, 2007). The Committee’s first action regarding issues of recruitment, 
vetting, and training was to decide on the qualifications and recruitment standards. A 
primary consideration was the need to attract qualified applicants from amongst the 
population, while avoiding individuals who had been involved in various crimes during 
the war. The Accra Peace Agreement had specified that all conflict-era militias including 




corporation facilities such as the National Port Authority, Liberia Telecommunications 
Corporation and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, should be dissolved (Jaye, 
2008). This challenge was made more difficult when the hundreds of former self-styled 
“police volunteers” from around the country flooded to Monrovia and presented 
themselves for recruitment. Thousands of former police officers from the pre-war Liberia 
National Police force also wanted to maintain their positions as part of the new police 
force (Friedman, 2011). According to an International Crisis Group Report (2009), the 
Committee decided and formally dissolved the old pre-war police and paramilitary 
organizations. All police and paramilitary officers were deactivated along with all self-
styled “police volunteers” who had roamed rural Liberia. The Committee then asked all 
interested individuals to apply, be subjected to the entire recruitment and vetting process, 
and undergo basic training. Ex-combatants and individuals under the age of 18 or over 55 
were ineligible to apply. UNPOL’s restructuring and recruiting section conducted the 
vetting. Local Liberian staff did not participate. The recruitment standards included 
possession of a high school diploma, good reputation and character in one’s local 
community, no war crime history, physical fitness, and successful completion of a written 
examination. The names of recruits were published in newspapers for approximately a 
week, requesting the public to come forward with information that might disqualify 
applicants. The Rule of Law Implementation Committee also sent names of recruits to 
leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations and human rights 




 The International Crisis Group (2009) reported that the recruitment and vetting 
process was controversial and marked by dissenting opinions especially over the decision 
to deactivate former police officers. Many local police leaders were concerned that this 
decision undermined institutional memory because many senior officers with decades of 
valuable policing experience had been relieved of their positions. Citizens and civil 
society organizations were concerned that the process made it possible for some 
applicants to give false information about their identities or hide information about their 
pasts. Liberian police leaders and local nongovernmental organizations such as the 
Liberia National Law Enforcement Association held the view that had the Committee 
included Liberian officers on the vetting team, this situation may have been avoided 
because local officers were better situated to verify the authenticity of applicants’ claims 
(Friedman, 2011). According to the report of the International Crisis Group (2009), there 
were also internal disagreements within the ranks of the UNMIL brass over the 
recruitment and vetting process. As early as 2005, UNMIL’s own human rights 
protection unit described the process as a failure, although others vehemently defended 
the process (Friedman, 2011).     
Training  
According to Friedman (2011), training of the first recruits began in 2004 at the 
National Police Academy. Initially, trainers at the academy were international police 
officers. Later in 2006, efforts were made to build local support by employing local 
Liberian trainers although these efforts were hampered by earlier decisions to deactivate 




The new LNP officers lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers and 
largely relied on the assistance of their international counterparts. The trainers used 
materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training situations 
in Kosovo and later in East Timor. Initially training was largely fast tracked and lasted 
about 3 months. Later, it increased to 6 months for both training at the National Police 
Academy and field training. In 2006, some training coordinators determined that the 
curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that it favored producing large number 
of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum was more suited for training of 
interim police officers than for the development of a sustainable long-term police force 
(Friedman, 2011). Moreover, the training materials did not cover subjects such as ethics, 
discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. The curriculum 
was revised in 2006. It included use of manuals on policies and procedures, report 
writing, and statement taking. It also covered subjects on police administration, ethics, 
discipline, democratic policing, criminal investigation, and community policing concepts 
and reflected best practices in other West African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. 
By that time, however, more than 2000 police officers had already been trained and 
deployed. They did not benefit from the contents of the new curriculum (UN Security 
Council S/2006/958, 2006).  
According to the Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nation’s 
Mission in Liberia (2012), UNMIL had vetted, trained, and deployed a new Liberia 
National Police force of more than 4,200 officers to date. UNPOL had trained 3,661 




has also set up specialized units within the new LNP organization. The Professional 
Services Unit (PSU) comprised 300 officers who received specialized training in crowd 
control in Nigeria. The unit serves as first line response to civil unrest such as riots and 
mob violence. The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) serves as the only armed counter-
insurgency response unit. The ERU will deal with crime situations which may require the 
use of firearms in the arrest of armed criminals, hostage situations, and violent crimes in 
progress (International Crisis Group Report, 2011). The end of UNMIL’s mission is near 
and its scheduled date of departure from Liberia is September 30, 2014. Liberians still 
remain genuinely concerned about what needs to be done to ensure police effectiveness 
and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and 
order after UNMIL’s departure.  
Objectives of International Police Reform 
This subsection describes the objectives of international police reform in 
postconflict states. The international community is increasingly involved in implementing 
police reform programs, especially in nations destabilized by political confusion and 
lawlessness, or weakened by civil wars. A review of the literature on the specific 
objectives of police reform and the strategies required to achieve them is critical to 
understanding how a successful reform program can contribute to an overall national 
reform agenda, particularly from the perspective of strengthening the process of 
democratization. Police reform in a postconflict situation is unlike reforms within police 
organizations in countries with stable, functioning governments such as in the United 




conflict experience under which instead of upholding the law, the police force is highly 
politicized and discredited because it was controlled by an unpopular regime that used the 
force as an instrument of political repression (Downes & Keane, 2006; Mulcahy, 2008). 
Alemika (2009) argued that in most African countries, pre-conflict police practice is 
characterized by regime protection and reactive policing. Police forces lack independence 
and policing is characterized by protection of the regime in power. The protection of 
rulers often culminates in violations of the rights of citizens thereby leading to open 
conflict.  
According to Alemika (2009) reactive policing is the form of policing by  which  
laws are enforced after they are violated. Reactive policing is in contrast to proactive 
policing whereby laws are enforced before they are violated. Proactive policing involves 
law enforcement by the prevention of general public insecurity and crime through 
surveillance, intelligence gathering, and promotion of cordial relations with local 
communities (Alemika, 2009). The reactive enforcement is manifested through 
investigations, apprehension, detention, and prosecution of those suspected of the crime. 
Here, the problem is that policing relies on victims to report crime, but victims are 
reluctant to do so because they perceive the police as ineffective. The experience of past 
police aggression and brutality under unpopular regimes raises the bar in determining the 
objectives and requirements of a sustainable police reform program in a postconflict 
situation. Understanding the key factors that lead to open conflict in a postconflict state 




force to become more responsive and effective in policing when those factors recur 
(Alemika, 2009).  
The goal of a transitional, postconflict police reform program must be structured 
so as to enable the new reform police force to break away from the illegitimate 
institutional practices of its discredited past. A reformed police force must be one that 
embraces democratic policing principles and values and plays its critical role as an 
integral component of democratization. This is defined as the process by which the rules 
and procedures for citizen participation in governance are applied to institutions that were 
previously governed by coercive control (Mulcahy, 1998). An effective democratic police 
force is critical to the character of the postconflict security provided. This makes police 
reform an integral part of the democratization process in a postconflict state. Here, the 
emphasis is on how to create an effective democratic police force that adheres to the 
requirements of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal is also to support 
expansion of democratization and ensure a safe environment that is conducive for 
investment and the development of market economies (Bayley, 2001; Alemika, 2009; 
Celador, 2005). Bayley (2001) described the following as characteristics of an effective 
police force that supports a sustainable program of democratization:  
• A democratic police force caters to the needs of individual citizens; it is 
impartial in its exercise of police authority and serves the needs of the 
citizens. Such a police force is not one that is controlled by the government 




should expect that their police force will respond effectively to their 
individual and community needs;  
• A democratic police force is one that serves the interest of individual citizens 
and their communities and demonstrates daily, that it is there to serve their 
interest; that its policing powers and protective capacity will be utilized to 
protect the citizens; 
• A democratic police force is accountable to the law and not to the 
government; here, police actions are guided by the rule of law. In other words, 
the policing authority should not be controlled or directed by the arbitrary 
actions of those in the government. This will avoid the likelihood of abuse of 
power and abuse of the rights of the citizens; and  
• A democratic police force is one that protects human rights. The protection of 
human rights also means that policing operations must at all times be impartial 
at all times. It must provide protection for individuals, groups and all of the 
processes and activities that are essential for the exercise of individual rights 
in a democracy. These activities include the exercise of rights such as freedom 
of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement and freedom to 
associate with others. The police must also protect the citizens from attempts 
by government functionaries to execute arbitrary arrest, and illegal detention. 
The police must also remain impartial in the administration of justice; and its 





The democratic policing characteristics outlined above are also expounded by the 
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). According to the 
DCAF (2006), emphasis on the goals and objectives of police reform have shifted from 
prioritizing technical training and skills such as in investigation and evidence gathering in 
the 1990s, to include a focus on upholding human security, basic human rights, equal 
protection of all citizens without discrimination against illegal acts under the law, 
exercising restraint in the use of force except to achieve a necessary result, equal 
treatment and equal access to justice, equal protection of potentially vulnerable groups 
such as children, the elderly, women, refugees, displaced persons and members of 
minority groups; and community policing. Community policing is the strategy by which 
the goals of policing are redirected towards service to communities and responsiveness to 
their needs. Community policing ensures effective police–community engagement 
through consultations and feedback and the integration of the concerns of the citizens and 
their communities into policing policies, management, and delivery of security services. 
This shift in emphasis is the result of increasing international involvement in 
peacekeeping operations and postconflict democratic governance reforms. The DCAF 
also emphasizes the development of a police force that is transparent and accountable in 
its operations. A police reform program must also emphasize the principles of ensuring 
equal treatment and access to security and justice, inclusiveness or an ethnically 
integrated new police force, professionalism in the exercise of police powers, effective 
chain of command structure, and availability of requisite resources such as equipment. A 




strong judicial framework and a civil society that can exercise independent oversight. The 
reform should be one that fosters cooperation between the reformed police and other 
security institutions and actors that are both local and international. DCAF links effective 
democratic policing to poverty reduction, sustainable social and political stability, and 
economic development. 
International Police Reform: Selected Cases 
Since the 1990s, the international community has devoted substantial efforts to 
police and security sector reforms in many postconflict nations. The postconflict police 
building program is conventionally regarded as a key process of transition to 
democratization particularly from the perspective of the protection of human rights 
(Bayley, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). This section briefly describes reform 
strategies of three police reform programs in Bosnia/Herzegovina, East Timor, and the 
Solomon Islands. The cases were selected because they bear similarity to ongoing police 
reform program in Liberia.  
The public safety and security mandates of the United Nations mission in each of 
the three postconflict states cited above were twofold: (a) restore law and order and 
provide security for all, and (b) restructure the local police force to ensure that they can 
effectively operate in accordance with international policing standards, principles of 
democratic policing and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Day, 2000; 
Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006; Dinnen et al., 2006). The restructuring 
strategies and certification processes employed by each of these missions were also 




previous human rights abuses. Training was provided to all officers (Hood, 2006; Lemay-
Hebert, 2009; Dinnen et al., 2006). At the time that each of these missions ended, they 
had achieved their mandate of restoring law and order.  In East Timor for example, the 
mission achieved a number of other successes including the monitoring of parliamentary 
and presidential elections in 2007 (Hood, 2006). However, all of the missions failed in 
their mandate to establish effective functioning local police force in each of the three 
postconflict states (Celador, 2005; Dinnen et al., 2006). In the cases of East Timor and 
Bosnia/Herzegovina, the failure to establish effective police force led to extended periods 
of operation with redefined mandates (Day, 2000; Hood, 2006; Celador, 2005).  The 
various reasons cited for the failure included political interference in the process, ethnic 
rivalries, ill-conceived police reform mandates, and failure to design country specific 
restructuring strategies (Furuzawa, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Strachan, 2009).  
Lessons Learned 
The lessons learned from the case studies above attest that police reform is a 
critical component of any successful postconflict statebuilding program. In the three 
cases discussed above, police reform was not successful despite successes in restoration 
and maintenance of law and order (Dinnen et al., 2006). What all three cases also have in 
common with the Liberia National Police is that in all situations, the police were part of 
the problem. They were corrupt, ethnically divided, militarized, and politically 
manipulated. They abused the human rights of those they were trained to protect, lost 
public confidence, and were ineffective at providing security for all citizens (Celador, 




reform program designs tended to be over-prescriptive, and non-consultative. The 
programs were not locally owned or planned in the context of local realities. This was the 
rationale for unsuccessful outcomes such as in the case of reforms in the Solomon Islands 
with a history of ethnic rivalries. The police restructuring programs were more complex 
and difficult to achieve. This led to the periodic replacement or extension of mandates of 
the reform missions. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL’s mission was extended in 2008, 
2012, 2013, and again in 2014 all on account of security sector reform concerns. 
Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) argue that governance reform interventions in political 
societies must ensure country ownership. No reform program can succeed without 
participation of all stakeholders including the citizens who are ultimately the intended 
beneficiaries. To the extent that the local context of policing varies from one country to 
another, the design and implementation of any international police reform assistance 
program must be based on context-specific knowledge and expertise in order to be 
successful. Many of the problems experienced in the missions in the three case studies 
raise questions about UNMIL’s approaches to police security reform in Liberia (Celador, 
2005; Dinnen et al., 2006; Strachan, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009). 
Literature Analysis and Conclusion 
Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues regarding 
international postconflict police reform assistance led by the UN and industrialized donor 
nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal 
democracies. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain stateness, foster 




emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger, 2007; Wiatrowski & 
Goldstone, 2010). Mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period and security 
challenges in reestablishing legitimate national authority in fragile states signal the 
increasing relevance of international police training interventions as a critical standard for 
the protection of human rights, upholding the rule of law, and improving government-
citizen relations in the global context (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009; West, 2011).  
International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful owing to 
factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local commitment to 
ownership. Call (2003) identified alternative perspectives that focus on police behavior in 
the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators 
from the ranks of the police force, maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of a 
possible return to conflict as well as facilitating the processes of democratization. Many 
challenges also confront national decision makers, the UN, and other donor partners in 
international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argued that most 
international police training strategies offered to postconflict nations by western 
democracies prove less effective because they do not adequately address issues such as 
conflict resolution, importance of citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human 
rights, and citizens’ engagement in crime control strategies. Call (2003) underscored that 
if a police reform program is to be successful, it must be holistic and must consider 
building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts, 
prosecutors, civil society etc.) that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of 




there are fewer credible models of policing. This creates the need for the reform program 
to adapt to local realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas, 
replicate their own models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked 
elsewhere. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform 
strategies must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific 
conditions in order to be successful.  
There is a well-founded fear amongst Liberians that conflict can return in the 
future if the UNMIL’s police training and reform programs do not yield effective results. 
What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and future 
implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN Mission in 
Liberia. UNMIL’s police training interventions provide an opportunity to assess how the 
UN has responded to the global challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of 
recruiting, training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break 
away from its discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public 
confidence as a professional force. 
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 2, I examine the contemporary scholarly literature on international 
postconflict police reform. I provide the conceptual basis of international interventions in 
postconflict police reform.  The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain 
stateness, foster stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support 
the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger, 




function of security and a condition under the social contract theory. The state must 
strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social contract and deliver 
security protection as a public good for which the citizens surrender responsibility for 
personal security and protection of life and property to government. Liberal democratic 
theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as an embodiment of state 
authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (Miller, 2010).  Public 
choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public good which benefits are 
expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing 
(Stiglitz, 2000; Kraxberger, 2007). Community policing theory emphasizes participation 
from local citizens for effective public safety (Kappler & Gaines, 2012). 
 Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues. Effective policing 
is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and 
sustainable.  International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful 
owing to factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local 
commitment to ownership (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Call (2003) underscored that if a 
police reform program is to be successful, it must consider building the capacities of 
other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts, prosecutors, civil society etc.) 
that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. Another challenge is 
that international police reform is relatively new and there are fewer credible models of 
policing (Bayley, 2006). This creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local 
realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own 




Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform strategies must vary 
from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions. Lessons learned 
from the case studies are that police reform programs must be context-specific, and be 
grounded in local participation.   
What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and 
future implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN mission 
in Liberia. UNMIL’s police training provides an opportunity to assess how the UN has 
responded to the challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of recruiting, 
training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break away from its 
discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public confidence. Chapter 




Chapter 3: Research Method  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the research design applied in the study. I provide a 
rationale for selecting the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry that grounds the 
study. I also describe the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research setting, sample and 
population, and process of data collection. I discuss issues of ethical considerations. I 
describe the role of the investigator and the steps taken to contact and protect participants 
in this study. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper understanding of how the 
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP 
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The overarching 
research question was the following: How has police training by the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the 
Liberia National Police to maintain law and order? The mixed-method model of inquiry, 
which combines both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was used as the most 
suitable method of inquiry for the study (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; 
Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The independent variable in this study was the training by 
the UN mission in Liberia. The dependent variable was the impact of the training on the 
effectiveness of LNP to maintain law and order and gain public confidence.  
   Research Design and Approach  
The LNP was chosen as a case study in order to carry out an in-depth study and to 
be able to assess the effects of the UNMIL’s police reforms on the organization. The 




phenomenon that is to be investigated. There may be insights to be gained from looking 
at one case, which can have wider implications that may not be realized by trying to 
cover a wider scope. The goal is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular 
(Denscombe, 2005). In this exploratory case study, I combined both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies. According to Creswell (2012), the planned mixing of the 
methods is a procedure for collecting, integrating, and analyzing both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study to understand a research problem. Rudestam and 
Newman (2007) also described the mixed model as 
A pragmatic approach in which questions of method are secondary to the adoption 
of an overriding paradigm or worldview guiding the investigation. Thus, it might 
be possible to mix research hypotheses of a confirmatory nature with general 
questions of an exploratory nature, structured interviews and scales that are 
quantitative with open-ended interviews and observations that are qualitative, and 
methods of analysis that draw on both traditions to expand the meaningfulness of 
the findings. (p. 51)      
The mixed model brings balance to data analysis and affirms interpretation. 
According to Creswell (2007), qualitative research is a process of inquiry through which 
the researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, and reports detailed 
information. The qualitative exploratory case study method of inquiry often is 
recommended for studies where the research requires exploration and there is a need to 
present a detailed account of the topic. The researcher needs to learn about the topic in 




& Newton, 2007). The method focuses on the study of real life situations, places, 
organizations, events, and concepts. It is preferred because of the type of data that are 
required and the purpose of the study, which is how the UNMIL’s police training and 
reform interventions have affected the maintenance of law and order and public 
confidence in the LNP. In this study, the qualitative method of inquiry was employed 
because international police reform under postconflict conditions is an emerging 
phenomenon. This methodology enabled the discovery of how the UNMIL administered 
its police reform program and what happened in the process. The objective was to 
determine whether any change might be needed to develop a police force that is effective 
for maintaining law and order and is legitimate in the eyes of Liberians.  
Quantitative research is based on the idea that information about a social 
phenomenon can be quantified or measured. It can be expressed numerically and 
analyzed by statistical methods (Creswell, 2012). From the quantitative perspective, I 
developed a competency skills level questionnaire and used the Likert rating scale to 
collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and 
disagreement levels. I also developed a questionnaire to evaluate police performance and 
the public confidence of graduates already working in the field. I reviewed documents 
and records and used open-ended and semistructured interview questions. The primary 
sources of data consisted of the following: (a) documentary sources such as reports, mass 
media, and archival sources; (b) individual semistructured interviews with open-ended 
questions; and (c) a survey questionnaire. The methods of analysis under the mixed-




2007). There was difficulty in identifying comparative baseline measures because prewar 
factual data do not exist because police records and documents were destroyed during the 
civil war (Jaye, 2008; Kromah, 2007; Malan, 2008). However, I used existing research 
(Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003) on the behavior of the Liberian police which measured 
citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war. I also did multiple year 
comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time 
UNMIL deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables that were 
considered included police preparedness and response to crime, riots, and natural or 
human made disasters and how they impact the effectiveness of, and public confidence 
in, the LNP.  
Setting and Sample  
In qualitative research, sampling is the process of selecting a subgroup of the 
population. The sample is the representative group of potential participants who are 
relevant given their understanding of the phenomenon under study (McNabb, 2008). In 
this section, I describe the population, sampling procedures, sample size, and the 
approaches that I used in selecting and accessing potential participants for the study. The 
research was done in Liberia. The target research population consisted of participants 
who have resided in Liberia before and after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between the warring factions in Accra, Ghana in 2003.  
Sampling Procedure  
In this section, I describe the procedures used to contact participants. According 




access to participants is crucial in the research process. Walden University’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approved both my dissertation proposal and my IRB application 
under approval #07-30-13-0065268 and authorized the use of the research instruments to 
conduct the research. Following the IRB approval, I submitted separate recruitment 
letters to my community partners for the survey and the interview. The recruitment letters 
provided information and criteria for participation in the study and how interested 
individuals could contact me to express their interest. The recruitment letters were 
displayed on the information boards of my community partners. My community partners 
also authorized me to use their public premises to conduct the research. For this study, 
my community partners were the UNMIL, LNP, the Ministry of Justice, University of 
Liberia, Federation of Liberian Youth, Institute for Research and Development, and the 
National Civil Society Council of Liberia.  
Potential participants first contacted me by phone to express their interest. I 
arranged meetings with interested participants who met the qualifications for 
participation at scheduled dates and times during which I gave them the consent forms. 
Initial contacts began with informal conversations about the research being undertaken 
and how important the result of the research might be for participants and for Liberia as a 
whole. I developed rapport and built participants’ trust by explaining the purpose and 
importance of the study, particularly why participants were targeted to participate in the 
study. I attempted to persuade participants that their knowledge about UNMIL’s police 
training program and their opinions about its outcome were important to the building of 




participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study and that 
their participation must be based on their voluntary informed consent. Participants were 
given the assurances that they were free to cancel their participation at any time. 
Participants were also assured of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout 
the study and long thereafter (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I conducted 
the research from December 2013 through August 2014. 
Sample Size  
The sampling practice most frequently applied in sampling procedures is to 
randomly select a sample size that is representative of the population, study it, and then 
generalize the findings from the sample to the whole population (Creswell, 2007; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). According to the report of the population and housing 
census conducted by the Government of Liberia (2008), the population of Liberia was 3.4 
million. There were also 1,566 registered community-based civil society organizations in 
Liberia (Civil Society Organizations Directory for Liberia, 2012). I drew a sample size  
from these community-based civil society organizations because they are a representative 
group of the population that is the beneficiary of UNMIL’s police training program. I 
drew a sample size from among the police officers who had been trained and deployed. 
According to the Report of the UN Secretary-General (2012), UNMIL had trained and 
deployed 4,200 police officers since the inception of its police training program in 2004. I 
also took a sample size from decision makers in government and in UNMIL.  
For this study, the selection criterion was experience as the unit of analysis. Here, 




administering UNMIL’s police training, or as an officer trained and deployed by UNMIL. 
It also meant experience as a decision maker or an observer and a targeted beneficiary 
from civil society of the outcome or impact of UNMIL’s police reform program. Random 
sampling and purposive sampling were utilized for the three categories of population 
based on experience as the criteria for selecting potential participants who are key 
informants. Key informants were participants who were knowledgeable about the 
phenomenon to be studied and who had the ability to provide information useful in 
drawing meaningful conclusions (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I 
proposed a sample size of 70 participants comprising 10 to 15 decision makers, 20 to 30 
police officers, and 15 to 25 members of civil society organizations to guide the research. 
However, after recruitment letters were posted, many police field officers and civil 
society members called and expressed interest to participate in the study. According to 
the literature, key informants should be recruited until the aim of the research is 
accomplished (Creswell, 2012; McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).  
I increased the sample size to 136 participants because of the diversity of data 
sources (Creswell, 2007). For the interview protocol, I used homogenous purposive 
sampling of 16 actors and decision makers. Key informants in this category included 
leaders of community-based civil society organizations, ranking officers of UNMIL’s 
Civil Affairs Division, the LNP, and former ranking officials of the Liberian Government 
as policy level decision makers who participated in, and were knowledgeable about the 
police training process. Their experiences as actors in the police training program 




consented to participate in the study but later declined. For the survey questionnaire, I 
used random sampling of 60 police officers and supervisors who were trained and 
deployed by UNMIL and were actively in the field. I also did random sampling of 60 
members and leaders of major community-based civil society organizations. Their 
experiences as civil society beneficiaries of UNMIL’s police training program 
purposefully informed the research problem. Sampling is the purposeful selection of 
potential respondents that are relevant for the study (Creswell, 2012; Singleton, 2005). 
Participants who responded to the survey questionnaire were leaders and members of 
community-based civil society organizations and police field officers and supervisors. 
Participants who responded to the interview questions were leaders of community-based 
civil society organizations, ranking officers of the LNP, officials of the Civil Affairs 
Division of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and officials of the Liberian 
government. The community-based civil society organizations included the Federation of 
Liberian Youth, Liberia Marketing Association, Center for Transparency and 
Accountability in Liberia, New African Research and Development Agency, Action for 
Genuine Democratic Alternatives and the National Coalition of Civil Society 
Organizations of Liberia. These organizations were a representative group of the 
population that was the anticipated beneficiary of the police training and reform program. 
I learned from their real life experiences and their perceptions about the new police force 
and about the overall police security reform program in Liberia. Table 1 below shows the 








Category of Participants 
 
              Population                   Sample Size 
  Interview 





Liberia National Police:    
Police Ranking officers            4            4 
Police Field Supervisors         1       10         11 
Police Rank-and-File         50         50 
    
UN Mission in Liberia: UNMIL    
          
Civil Affairs Officials         4               4 
    
Government of Liberia:     
Ranking Officials of Government         3              3 
    
Civil Society Organizations:     
Leaders -  Civil Society          6             6 
Members – Civil Society          60          60 
    
Total number of participants       18       120        138 
 
                                                               













I collected data for this research on location in Liberia. This was because UNMIL 
was still actively involved in police reform efforts in the country, and also because all of 
the other actors and prospective participants were in Liberia. A limitation in the 
collection and analysis of the data was the difficulty in identifying comparative baseline 
measures because pre-war factual data did not exist as police records and documents 
were destroyed during the civil war. However, I used existing research (Kromah, 2007; 
Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted 
by Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil 
war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I also did multiple year comparisons 
of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time UNMIL 
deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables considered included police 
preparedness and response to riots and natural or manmade disasters and how they affect 
the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the LNP.   
Pilot Test 
Following the IRB’s final approval, I conducted a pilot test. According to 
Rudestam and Newton (2007), a pilot test is appropriate because it can help strengthen 
the validity and reliability of the instruments. The pilot test was administered in 
Monrovia, Liberia with a sample size of 15 respondents who did not form part of the 
main study target group members. They possessed the characteristics similar to the main 
target audience. A response pattern to ensure an understanding of the questions was also 




was needed. The one rationale was that one set of questions sought information that only 
police officers could provide, while the other rationale was that some of the survey items 
were written in ways that were not clear and did not solicit the appropriate responses. I 
filed a Request for Change in Procedure Form with the IRB to revise the language in 
some of the items and to prepare separate survey questionnaires for the Liberia National 
Police. The IRB granted my request and the revisions were made. The revisions did not 
change the original content of the questionnaire. The data collection instruments I used in 
this study consisted of a set of 13 individual interview questions, a separate survey 
questionnaire which comprised 31 items for community-based civil society respondents, 
and a survey questionnaire which comprised 40 items for officers of the LNP. Other data 
sources utilized were public documents and observational field notes. 
 The four sets of data analyzed were the folllowing: (1) survey questionnaire; (2) 
interview questions, (3) documents, and (4) field notes. I dsigned a survey questionnaire 
to collect quantitative data using a Likert rating scale (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2008). The questionnaire consisted of two types with one specifically for 
participants from the LNP and the other for members of community-based civil society 
organizations. This rationale was that some of the survey items were specific only to 
police participants who participated in the UNMIL police training and were deployed in 
field as officers. I used the interview questions to collect qualitative data (Creswell, 
2012). Participants in the interview protocol were ranking officers of the LNP, officials 
of the UNMIL, officials of the government of Liberia, and leaders of community-based 




archival sources, institutional reports, and reports from mass media including local and 
international newspapers on the Liberian National Police (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & 
Newton, 2007). I also used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 
1992) on the condition and behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted by 
Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war 
and served as a comparative baseline measure. I maintained meticulous records of 
observational field notes and used good quality recording tapes which aided in the 
transcription and analysis of the data (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).   
The data for this study was collected from multiple sources, namely interviews, 
survey questionnaires, documents, and field notes. I utilize three sources of data for the 
qualitative component of the research. These sources were interviews, documentary 
sources, and the field notes. For the quantitative component, I applied survey 
questionnaires utilizing the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured 
numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels.  
Qualitative Data 
Interviews  
The survey interview is one of the main sources of data collection in a qualitative 
study. In this study, the interviews consisted of prepared, semistructured questions that 
focused on the purpose of the research. I used the individual, in-depth interview 
technique because it was intensive and flexible, and it allowed me to solicit detailed 
information about the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 




technique was individual one-on-one interviews. I conducted face-to-face, individual, in-
depth interviews with informants to solicit key information and to explore the subject 
matter of the interviews in detail (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I took care not to engage 
participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews and ensured that the questions 
were answered in appropriate sequence. I also probed for details and sought clarifications 
to avoid ambiguities ((McNabb, 2008). There was one case in which 3 key informants 
who were ranking officers in the LNP preferred not to be recorded. The informants 
signed the consent form and responded to the interview questions in writing.    
Documents 
According to Singleton and Straits (2005), documentary sources include public 
documents, reports, mass media, and archival sources. In this study, I used available 
documentary sources which included public documents from UNMIL, LNP, and the 
Ministry of Justice reports and literature reviews. Other documentary sources that I used 
included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana in 2003 between 
Liberia’s warring factions, relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and 
mandates, and reports from local and international newspapers on the LNP.  
Field Notes 
The final source of qualitative data for the study was my recorded field notes. 
According to Creswell (2007), the researcher’s observational field notes are a credible 
source of valid data. I maintained meticulous records of observations in the field and kept 
a journal of the notes that I took on a daily basis during the interviews and throughout the 




                                                         Quantitative Data 
Survey Questionnaire 
In order to focus on the research objective, I prepared and used semi-structured 
and open-ended survey questionnaires using Likert scales for two separate sets of 
participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I used the Likert rating scale 
to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and 
disagreement levels. On the scale items, I asked respondents to rate each item on a 5 item 
response scale of disagreement and agreement levels where 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 
3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree; and 5=neutral (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2008). I also developed the questionnaire to evaluate police performance and 
public confidence of graduates already working in the field. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the 
data, conducted comparisons, and validated the findings through triangulation (Creswell, 
2012).    
Issues of Ethics and Quality 
My primary responsibility as a researcher was to behave in an ethical manner and 
uphold ethical standards throughout the study. The ethical issues involved in data 
collection include requirements for ensuring informed voluntary consent, protecting 
confidentiality of participants, and being careful in clearly communicating information 
about any benefits of the research to participants. Additionally, I concerned myself with 
the possible risks of their involvement as participants and the need to communicate with 
participants before and after the research. The main ethical issues were the need for 




experience harm or were not placed at some disadvantage as a result of their participation 
(Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Ethical concerns of quality also revolved 
around the need to establish the credibility of the research. The requirement for 
credibility was to ensure validity and reliability. Reliability is the extent to which 
research is dependable or has the potential to produce the same results when replicated 
under similar circumstances. Strategies to improve reliability include maintaining 
meticulous records of fieldwork, using good quality recording tapes, and documenting 
the process of analysis. I applied these strategies during the course of data collection. 
These strategies aided in transcribing and analyzing the data and establishing the stability 
of responses from the participants (Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001). Validity is 
the extent to which the research findings are accurate and well-founded and are in 
consonance with participants’ perspectives and beliefs. Acceptable measures of validity 
recommended by the authors include prolonged engagement with participants to build 
trust, persistent observation and learning, checking for misinformation, using field notes, 
memos, and multiple researchers, using multiple sources of data, peer review, clarifying 
researcher’s bias, member checking, providing rich thick description, and external audits 
(Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).   
In this study, I attempted to deepen my knowledge and understanding by building 
trust through personally visiting participants and spending extensive time with them in 
the field. I used a tape recorder to record interviews, probe and check for misinformation. 
I maintained thorough records of field work, and documented the process of analysis. I 




the study. The findings were peer reviewed by professionals in the field. Additionally, the 
preliminary findings were also shared with selected participants for their feedback to 
ensure that they conform to the participants’ experiences, perceptions and beliefs. These 
measures enhanced accuracy and the quality standard of the study (McReynolds et al., 
2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  
Researcher’s Role 
I personally conducted the research and managed the processes involved at all 
stages from data collection, data analysis, and report writing. I recruited potential 
participants for the interviews through use of cell phones and visits to participants’ 
offices or locations. I served as the primary instrument for data collection. During the 
interviews, I used good quality voice recorders and took written notes, all of which I used 
in transcribing and analyzing the data. I collected all relevant documents. I utilized my 
technical training and skills in conducting interviews which were achieved while working 
as a hiring services analyst with the City of Philadelphia. I also utilized my longstanding 
public service experience as an economist, lawyer, and public administrator, as well as 
my knowledge as a newspaper columnist and author on socioeconomic and political 
governance issues on Liberia.  
Avoiding Researcher’s Bias 
I avoided bias in the research because doing so was critical to credibility and 
trustworthiness. I remained conscious of my role as the researcher and the main 
instrument of data collection to avoid bias in the data collection process. According to 




collection can be tainted by bias given his proximity with the data and its sources. I 
maintained a high degree of consciousness about the possibility of bias and I was 
objective in the process at all times. In order to enhance credibility and trustworthiness, I 
took care not to engage participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews.  
Participants’ Protection 
Protecting participants by maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was critical 
to the success of this study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their voluntary 
informed consent. I explained the purpose of the study and how the information they 
gave would be used in the research. I explained the consent form and informed 
participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study, 
reminding them that their participation was based on their voluntary informed consent. 
Before starting the interviews and survey questionnaires,  I gave participants the 
assurance that they were free to cancel their participation at any time that they wished to 
do so. I assured participants of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout 
the study. I demonstrated respect for the privacy of the participants by asking them to 
decide where they should be interviewed. After the interview data was collected, the 
identity of participants was sealed by use of codes in the data analysis presentation 
(McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).  A detailed description of actual ranks and 
positions of the key informants, especially for the qualitative interview data, cannot be 
cited because doing so may reveal their identification. Participants in qualitative 
interviews consisted of ranking officers of UNMIL Civil Affairs Division, leaders of key 




directorate, police field supervisors, career trial lawyers, former solicitors-general, a 
former Judge of the Civil Law Court, and ranking government officials, including a 
former minister of justice and a former minister of labor. I coded the names of participant 
interviewees in letters and numbers to maintain confidentiality. I coded the UNMIL 
respondents as UN with the first respondent on the list as UN1, followed by UN2 and so 
on. I coded leaders of civil society organizations as CSO1, followed by CSO2 and so on. 
I coded ranking police officers as PO1, PO2, PO3, et cetera. I coded ranking officials and 
former officials of government including judges, lawyers, solicitors-general, and 
ministers as G1, G2, G3 and so on. All respondents demonstrated interest in the research 
and considered it necessary and timely considering the looming UNMIL drawdown.   
   
Chapter Summary  
In Chapter 3, I described the theoretical method of inquiry and design that 
grounds the study. I used the mixed-method model combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies as the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry. From the 
quantitative perspective, I developed a survey questionnaire and used the Likert rating 
scale to collect quantitative data. From the qualitative perspective, I used open-ended and 
semistructured interview questions. I also reviewed documents and records. The primary 
sources of data consisted of documentary sources such as reports, mass media, and 
archival sources, as well as individual semistructured interviews with open-ended 
questions for stakeholders. The methods of analysis under the mixed-model approach 




both the interview and survey questionnaire was 138. Participants were purposefully 
selected utilizing experience criterion as unit of analysis. I coded and analyzed the data 
through detailed description, direct interpretation, and the establishment of patterns. I  
examined the impact of UNMIL’s police training on the effectiveness of, and public 
confidence in, the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order. I 
validated the research findings by using multiple sources of data, rich thick description, 
member checking and peer review. The methodology yielded information that 
contributed to my understanding of the context of international postconflict police reform 
as a critical tool for postconflict state building. In Chapter 4, I analyze the data and 
present the findings in response to the research questions.   
 




Chapter 4: Results, Data Analysis, and Findings 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze the data and present the findings of the study. 
Participants in the sample were asked to indicate their views on how the UNMIL’s police 
training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively 
maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The data analysis was divided into 
three sections. In the first section, I summarize the data instruments used in the study. 
The second section provides a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of 
participants. In the third section, I present the results of the statistical analyses of 
participants’ perceptions, views, and responses that answered the research questions.   
Summary of Data Instruments 
The survey and interview items were used to measure competencies that were 
arranged in three defined categories and subcategories: (a) recruitment strategy, (b) 
training, and (c) effectiveness on job performance. Recruitment strategy was used to 
measure procedures applied by UNMIL in the recruitment and vetting of applicants for 
the new LNP. Training was used to measure the nature and content of knowledge and 
skills imparted, inclusive of country-specific policing guidelines, and citizens’ perception 
of training acquired based on demonstrated police performance. According to McLellan 
(1998), the benefits derived from police training are not easily measured and are often 
realized in the long term. However, they can be reasonably assessed by the targeted 
beneficiaries. In the case of Liberia, the targeted beneficiaries of the UNMIL police 




were in the position to make a before-and-after comparison and gauge the relation 
between police training acquired and their effectiveness on job performance.  
The effectiveness on job performance was used to measure the ability of the 
police to apply knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations 
and maintain law and order. Subcomponents of effectiveness on job performance were 
the following: (a) public confidence, and (b) police conduct. Public confidence was used 
to measure the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the ability of the police to provide fair, 
impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the exercise of police authority and to 
respond effectively and timely to crime. Police conduct was used to measure behaviors 
and practices of police officers which impact on police integrity. Table 2 below shows 
how each category was defined and the competency that was measured. Table 2 also 
shows the items assigned from both survey and interview instruments. In the case of the 
interview protocol, several probing questions were posed to respondents in addition to the 
















Competency Category                  Survey & Interview Items  
                  Survey  
                 Items:                        
Interview 
Items: 
5.  Recruitment Strategy: 
Measured procedures established and 
thoroughness applied in the 
recruitment and vetting processes to 
ensure that only applicants who had 
not committed human rights abuses 
and who had demonstrated good 










Item #s:  
 
8, 9,10, 11, 






1, 10, 12, 13 
II. Training: 
Measured nature and content of 
knowledge and skills imparted 
inclusive of local content and 
international policing principles; and 
citizens’ perception of training 
acquired based on demonstrated 
performance by police. 
 
 




15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24  
 
 5, 6, 8 
III. Effectiveness on Job 
Performance: 
Measured the capacity of the police 
trained to respond effectively in 
conducting policing operations; to 
maintain law and order and gain the 
confidence and trust of the citizenry.  
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30  
25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 39, 40  
 
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9,  
10, 11, 13 
Effectiveness Subcategory:    
3a. Public Confidence  
Measured citizens’ self-assurance in 
the ability of the police to respond 
effectively and timely to crime; and 
public perception   of fair and 
impartial treatment in the exercise of 
police authority. 
 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 
19, 21, 25, 34 
 
 
25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30,  
32, 33, 34, 40 
 
 3, 7, 10, 11,  
12, 13 
3b. Police Conduct 
Measured behaviors and practices of 
officers that impact on police 
integrity and public confidence. 
 
6, 17, 22, 23, 24, 
26, 27, 28, 29 
 
 
32, 33, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39 
 







 In this section, I describe the demographic characteristics of police officers and 
civil society actors who responded to the survey questionnaire. I present the data in two 
parts. The first part is about the demographic characteristics of civil society actors. The 
second part is about the demographic characteristics of police officers.  
Demographic Characteristics of Civil Society Participants 
 The data shows that 33 (55%) of the civil society participants were females and 
27 (45%) were males (Table 4). A majority of the civil society participants were between 
35 and 59 years of age, indicating that they were middle-aged people (constituting 52%). 
This was followed by youthful citizens between 18 and 35 years, constituting 43.3% 
(Table 3). The percentage of the civil society participants aged 60 years and above was 
small (5.0%). The ratio of those participants were married or single (Table 5). A majority 
of the civil society participants were college students representing 43.3% followed by 
college graduate and those attending graduate school, representing 37% (Table 6). The 
participants concurred with the police officers that background checks were important in 
recruiting police officers. The participants also concurred that the background checks by 














Table 3  
 
Age of Civil Society Participants 
 
Age Frequency Percent 
 
Between 18-35 Years 26 43.3 
Between 35-59 Years 31 51.7 
60 Years and Older 3 5.0 





Gender of Civil Society Participants 
  
Gender Frequency Percent 
 
Male 27 45.0 
Female 33 55.0 
Total 60 100.0 
 
 
Table 5    
 
Marital Status of Civil Society Participants 
 
Marital Status Frequency Percent 
 
Single 25 41.7 
Married 27 45.0 
Divorced 4 6.7 
Widow 2 3.3 
Total 58 96.7 
Missing 99.00 2 3.3 











Educational Level of Civil Society Participants 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 
Did not go to school 2 3.3 
Junior high school 5 8.3 
High school 5 8.3 
College 26 43.3 
Graduate/Post graduate school 22 36.7 
Total 60 100.0 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Police Officers  
 The data shows that 23 (38%) of the police participants were females, and 37 
(61%) were males (Table 8). A majority of the police participants were between 18 and 
35 years of age, indicating that they were youthful law enforcement officers. Thirty-seven 
(62%) were married, and 22 (37%) were single (Table 9). A majority of the police 
participants were high school graduates, indicating that they met the recruitment criteria 
regarding educational level (constituting 63%). Approximately one-tenth of the police 
participants were college students (Table 10). Regarding the police training program, all 
of the police participants (100%) indicated that they graduated from the police training 
academy (Table 11). A majority graduated in 2007 (28.3%) followed by 2005 (18.3%). 
The third group graduated in 2006 and 2009 with the same number of graduates, 
constituting 13.3% (see Table 12). Most of the police described their professional area of 
concentration as criminal investigation representing 35% followed by multiple areas of 
assignment representing other as 32% (see Table 13). Traffic control constituted 15%. 




with SD = 0.22); followed by background checks (M = 2.88) and by physical ability as 
well as honesty (M = 2.82 and M = 2.81 respectively).  
            Table 7 
 Age of the Police Participants 
 
Age Frequency Percent 
 
Between 18-35 Years 31 51.7 
Between 35-59 Years 28 46.7 
60 Years and Older 1 1.7 
Total 60 100.0 
           
            
         Table 8 
 
 Gender of the Police Participants 
 






Male 37 61.7 
Female 23 38.3 
Total 60 100.0 
           
 
            Table 9  
 
 Marital Status of Police Participants 
 






Single 22 36.7 
Married 37 61.7 
Divorced 1 1.7 







           Table 10 
 
 Police Training: Education of the Police Participants 
 
Educational Level Frequency Percent 
 
Junior high school 1 1.7 
High school 38 63.3 
College 18 30.0 
Graduate/graduate school 3 5.0 
Total 60 100.0 
 
 
           Table 11 
 
 Police Training: Did you graduate from the Police Academy? 
 































Police Training: In what year did you graduate from the Police Academy? 
 






2000 1 1.7 
2002 1 1.7 
2005 11 18.3 
2006 8 13.3 
2007 17 28.3 
2009 8 13.3 
2010 4 6.7 
2011 2 3.3 
2012 4 6.7 
2013 1 1.7 
2014 1 1.7 
1995 1 1.7 
1979 1 1.7 




Police Training: Please indicate your professional area of concentration 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Criminal investigation 21 35.0 
Traffic Control 9 15.0 
General Civil Protection 9 15.0 
Other 19 31.7 
Total 58 96.7 
Missing 99.00 2 3.3 











 Results of Data Analysis  
 
In this study, I used the survey and interview instruments to determine 
participants’ perception of the ways in which, if any, the UNMIL training made a 
difference in police effectiveness and public confidence in the context of recruitment 
strategies, training, and effectiveness on job performance. I used the data instruments also 
to   determine whether there were challenges that required reform. In this section, I 
present the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views, and 
responses that answered the research questions. I present the results and analyses by 
category and subcategories of the variables being measured in the context of answering 
the research questions.     
Research Question 1 
What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?  
I sought to assess the strategy or procedure applied by UNMIL in recruitment and 
vetting of applicants for the new LNP. This included any possible participation of the 
local population in the recruitment process to ensure that only applicants with good 
character, who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good 
behavior in the local communities, were recruited. The UN international police reform 
mandates for postconflict states require that restructuring strategies include a thorough 
process of recruitment, vetting, and investigation of candidates for previous human rights 
abuses (Day, 2000; Celador, 2005; Vetschera & Damian, 2006).  
I analyzed the responses from the survey questionnaire, interview transcripts, 




checks was important for recruitment of applicants to serve in the new LNP (Table 15: 
M=4.77); and civil society respondents also agreed with the police assessment (Table 16: 
M=4.77). However, while police and civil society respondents all agreed that that 
conducting background checks was  important for recruitment, they concurred that 
background checks conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and that the vetting process 
did not prevent applicants who had committed human rights abuses from being recruited 
into the police force (Tables 15: M=2.75; and 16: M=2.18). Interview respondents also 
agreed with this view. Responses from participants in the interview indicated that the 
UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting processes from the onset were less organized and less 
thorough, and that this situation caused criminals and former combatants to be recruited 

















Police Perception of UNMIL Recruitment Criteria (n = 60) 
  
UNMIL Recruitment Criteria Low High Mean* SD 
Education 2.00 3.00 2.95 0.22 
Tribe 1.00 3.00 1.07 0.32 
Physical Ability 2.00 3.00 2.82 0.39 
 Honesty 1.00 3.00 2.81 0.44 
Background Check         1.00        3.00        2.88        0.37 
Trauma Healing/Counseling         1.00        3.00        1.21        0.59 
Membership in old LNP         1.00        3.00        1.15        0.52 
Not being a former combatant         1.00        3.00        1.89        0.82 



























Police Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n = 60) 
 
 
Survey Items  
Low High Mean* Std. 
Deviation 
Backgrounds checks are important 
for the recruitment of applicants to 
serve in the Liberia National Police. 
1.00 5.00 4.77 0.77 
Background checks conducted by 
UNMIL were thorough and 
prevented former combatants from 
being admitted for training. 
1.00 5.00 2.75 1.65 
Applicants recruited for training 
were given trauma counseling 
before starting training. 
1.00 5.00 1.98 1.41 
Liberian Government officials 
were involved in the recruitment 
and selection of applicants for 
police training. 
1.00 5.00 2.75 1.49 
Liberian Government officials 
exercised oversight to ensure that 
police training content was country-
specific. 
1.00 5.00 2.18 1.23 
During the recruitment if a 
citizen knew an applicant who had 
committed human rights abuses he 
or she would not complain to 
UNMIL for fear of revenge. 
1.00 5.00 4.00 1.24 
     
5.  Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4= 






According to interview respondents, the UNMIL’s recruitment process from the 
onset began by UNMIL officers calling interested persons through loudspeakers to come 
and join. The UNMIL police recruiting officers mounted on vehicles with loudspeakers 
went into the communities around Monrovia and started randomly calling on interested 
persons to come and join the police. According to CSO5, during the civil war, more than 
60% of Liberian youth took up arms. The war lasted 14 years and most of these youths 
grew up knowing only about the use of arms. By the time the UNMIL recruitment 
started, most of these people were the ones who first rushed to get recruited. They felt 
that being in the police was the way they could protect themselves in the communities 
because they knew that residents in these communities knew about their involvement in 
atrocities against them during the war.  
On the question of whether UNMIL applied due diligence to ensure that former 
combatants were not recruited, UN1 argued that: 
“It was not written in black and white, but former combatants certainly were 
 exempted from the process. But again given the number of combatants in the 
 country nobody can say they know all their former ex-combatants but then that’s 
 why the thing was open also to the public because the public would be able to 















Low High Mean* Std. 
Deviation 
Background checks are important for 
recruitment of applicants to serve in the 
Liberia National Police. 
1.00 5.00 4.77 0.621 
The behavior of the Liberia National 
Police show that background checks 
conducted by UNMIL prevented former 
combatants from being admitted for 
training. 
1.00 5.00 2.18 1.19 
During recruitment if a citizen knew an 
applicant who had committed human rights 
abuses he or she would not complain to 
UNMIL for fear of revenge. 
1.00 5.00 3.90 1.13 
     
5.  Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4= 
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree 
However, the theme which emerged was that the recruitment process was arbitrary and 
compromised due diligence in favor of recruitment of large numbers of candidates. G3, a 
former solicitor-general in the Ministry of Justice observed that: 
 “UNMIL recruitment process, I believe was wrong. They came and just took the 
 microphone, the loud speakers went around in the communities in their pickups 
 and saying “who all want to join the police come!” without giving the Liberian 
 people the opportunity to say look this man participated in the war; or he did this, 
 he did this. So they recruited people on their own and their vetting standards were 




 it itself. You see, so they came and said well we just have to take anybody we can. 
 And as a result, the police force does have an integrity problem where people who 
 participated in crimes around the country are in the security services, and it is 
 known.”  
Interview participants G2, PO1, PO2, PO3, CSO1, CSO4 and CSO5 all concurred 
with this view. They argued that in the years especially between 2004 and 2007, 
candidates who were  recruited were not investigated with due diligence regarding their 
previous human rights records to ensure that only applicants who did not commit human 
rights abuses were enlisted. CSO5 maintained that “We saw at the beginning of the whole 
recruitment and training of new police that there was not sufficient due diligence done in 
terms of going and engaging communities.” Citizens in the local communities were not 
consulted regarding prior behaviors and character of candidates. G1 also concurred with 
this view:  
 “At the time I served as Minister of Justice, I felt that there were some lapses in 
 the process in that many of the recruits that UNMIL hired were people who were 
 perpetrators of heinous crimes during the civil crisis. We even argued that we 
 don’t have any issue that these people should come and may be rehabilitated. But 
 you need to have people with more experience; some old hands in the business to 
 be here to serve as mentors of these people. But UNMIL refused. They recruited 
 people entirely new; many of them young people who had been involved into all 
 kinds of things. UNMIL did not listen to what we were telling them. So you know 




 and that crime and turned over for prosecution. It doesn’t tell very well for a force 
 that was trained by people such as the United Nations.” 
Participants argued that UNMIL should have done more radio communication in the 
country’s local vernaculars to inform residents in the local communities that police 
applicants should be people who have good character and good human rights 
backgrounds.  
Similar themes emerged over the vetting process. Police and civil society 
participants in the survey strongly agreed that conducting background checks were 
important for the recruitment of police applicants. However, they acknowledged that the 
recruitment and vetting processes conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and did not 
prevent some applicants who had poor human rights records from being recruited. 
Interview participants UN1 and UN2 argued that the vetting process was open to the 
public throughout the country. According to UN1, pictures of candidates were posted at 
various locations including marketplaces throughout the country because the public 
would be able to identify ex-combatants and other applicants who had some kind of 
human rights issues and then pass the information to UNMIL. UN3 explained:  
”We used that method because we felt that the citizens were trusting UN as 
 impartial body to convey their messages without any fear. Whenever a name or 
 information was given to us about applicants, we confidentially provided them to 
 the recruiting officers and there were no cases of retaliation.”    
In contrast, the themes that surfaced most was that during the vetting process, citizens 




known criminals from their neighborhoods to UNMIL, especially in first four years of the 
recruitment. Because security was fragile at that time, UNMIL did not provide immediate 
protection for people in the local communities. For fear of retribution, citizens in the local 
communities avoided giving information to UNMIL on any candidates especially, those 
who were ex-combatants, former soldiers of the old disbanded army, police, and known 
criminals from the neighborhoods. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO3 all concurred with this 
view. According to PO3, there was fear of the unknown and the people did not feel safe 
or free to give information to UNMIL. PO1 argued that: 
 “They would not report to UNMIL as to the person’s past abuses and criminal 
 record. Primarily because they didn’t feel that the system in itself actually was 
 strong enough to provide them the kind of protection that they needed if they 
 provided such information.” 
G2 also explained that: 
 “People were afraid that there could be reprisals because especially from the 
 beginning when they were recruiting at the time that right after the war police was 
 not present everywhere and even UNMIL was not present everywhere and they 
 were putting pictures of these people on bulletin and asking people to come and 
 report. People were afraid to report. And number two, the publicity was poor.”  
The lesson here was that as the result of these lapses in the recruitment and vetting 
processes, former combatants known to have committed human rights abuses, and 
individuals who exhibited bad behavior in the neighborhoods were recruited into the new 





“I used to live on the Old Road during the period of the crisis. One of the fighters who 
really terrorized us in the community became a big person in the police. Yes, when I 
moved to where I am now, I saw him again in that neighborhood. I got terrified because 
he knew how he terrified us.” 
CSO2: 
 “There is a young lady who is now in the police. When she lived before in our        
community, she went and took feces and put it in the community’s well, you know out of 
anger. They had to close the well because of that. That woman got recruited in the 
police.” 
Apart from feelings of insecurity and fear of retribution, other social and 
economic factors such as high unemployment also impacted negatively on the vetting 
process. UN4 acknowledged that there were “isolated cases” in which people would 
avoid reporting individuals who had demonstrated bad behaviors in the communities:  
“I wouldn’t say people would fear retribution. I would say most people would 
 consider that if I did this, I would be harming somebody who wants to earn a 
 living. So this is more on the social consideration rather than on understanding 
 human rights and the need to pay for human rights abuses.”   
G1 and CSO5 argued in contrast that such cases would not apply to known criminals and 
former combatants. By the time UNMIL determined in 2006 that its recruitment and 
vetting processes had been compromised and needed to be revised, more than 2000 police 




Research Question 2 
What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the 
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force?  
Through this  question, I sought to assess police training and effectiveness on job 
performance. Training measured the nature of knowledge and skills imparted inclusive of 
local content or country-specific policing guidelines and methods applied. The Geneva 
Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (2006) emphasized that the new 
focus of international police reform interventions in addition to technical training and 
skills such as criminal investigation and evidence gathering in the 1990s, included 
upholding human security, basic human rights, equal protection of all citizens without 
discrimination, exercising restraint in the use of force, equal access to justice, and equal 
protection of potentially vulnerable groups. The citizens’ perception of training acquired 
was also assessed based on demonstrated performance by police trained and deployed. 
The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to apply 
knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations and maintain 
law and order.   
Research Hypothesis  
For the quantitative component, the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) 
was used to analyze the data collected. The data collected was coded and entered into 
SPSS current version (V 20). A frequency was run to clean the data. Data entry errors 





H0: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of law and 
order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force. 
H11: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law and 
order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police Force.  
The UNMIL training began in 2004. Police respondents agreed that they acquired 
technical knowledge and skills during the UNMIL training through various courses 
ranging from criminal investigation, civil protection and the rule of law to international 
policing principles such as upholding human rights, equal protection of all citizens 
including protection of potentially vulnerable groups (Table 17). Correlations and 
regression were used to evaluate the hypotheses. There is a moderately significant 
correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained during UNMIL 
training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35). However, the 
relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained increases, the job 
performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The implication is that 
as more resources were being used in training the police, limited resources were used for 
on the job performance which also formed the basis for a reduction in police 
effectiveness.  
In research question 2, I also explored issues revolving around the UNMIL’s 
training decisions and coordination challenges that impacted on program results. The 
issue of the need for psychological trauma counseling to police recruits was raised. The 
findings show police respondents indicated the view that UNMIL did not consider trauma 




expressed the view that some level of psychological counseling should have been 
provided by UNMIL as an integral part of the training strategy. Respondents emphasized 
that counseling was needed because the country was just emerging from conflict, and that 
former combatants and criminals had found their way into the rank-and-file of the new 
police force and some had even become supervisors. PO2, Commandant and Deputy 
Director for Training at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this view 
and stressed that because the training was against the backdrop of the civil war, “there is 
a need for psycho-social counseling for officers of the LNP. They need to tell their stories 
in order to get healing. They need reconciliation too amongst themselves as some of their 
supervisors were perpetrators of violence as members of the several belligerent forces.”       
The earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program in addition to the 
recruitment challenges were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the 
training. Trainers at the Liberia National Police Academy were international police 
officers of contributing countries from around the world including Bangladesh, China, 
Ghana, Great Britain, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, United States, and Zimbabwe. After 2006, member countries 
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also continued to 
provide trainers from its member countries. Early in the program, Liberian officials 
voiced their concerns over the diversity of trainers from different policing jurisdictions. 
G3, a former Solicitor-General and now a Judge who earlier taught at the Liberia 




whether or not the UNMIL training was coordinated and followed country-specific 
guidelines:    
 “I am not sure of what it is today, but when the training started, it was not 
 coordinated. It was disjointed. For example, you have a group of trainers coming 
 from Ukraine; you have another group coming from Israel; you have another 
 group coming from Malaysia; you have another group coming from UK . . . so 
 our people were confused in the early days. They were taking training and 
 instructions from different people. . .  .  For example some trainers will tell our 
 people the way we march, the kinds of steps we take is wrong; that we should 
 take steps the other way like the British do: they hold their steps and throw it, they 
 hold their steps and throw it; unlike the US you take marching steps in beat. . . 
 some trainers trained to salute like the US do with your arm across  your eyebrow; 
 some other trainers trained like the British do with your palm exposed above your 
 forehead . . . So they confused our trainees. One week or two weeks the people 
 from Russia will train them; another two weeks the people from Great Britain will 
 train them; another two weeks the people from Zimbabwe will train them . . . and 
 each of these came with their own methods of training. . . I know for a fact that 
 the discipline aspect was a problem also because one group of trainers were 
 telling police officers they are not supposed to greet or salute their seniors; 
 another group telling them no you must greet your seniors and pay respect to them 







LNP: Knowledge and Skills Competency of Police Officers (n= 60) 
 
5.  Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= 
Agree, 5= Strongly Agree 
Knowledge and Skills Competency Low High Mean Std. Deviation 
As a Police Officer who underwent the 
UNMIL training, the content of the training 
received was understood and comprehensive. 
                1.00 5.00 4.45 
                                 
0.67 
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and 
skills in civil protection during the UNMIL 
training.      
2.00 5.00 4.57 0.59 
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and 
skills in crime scene investigation and 
prevention. 
4.00 5.00 4.60 0.49 
Training facilities and materials provided by 
UNMIL were adequate and appropriate. 
2.00 5.00 4.28 0.64 
UNMIL training emphasized that fair and 
impartial training of citizens is important in the 
exercise of police authority. 
1.00 5.00 4.67 0.65 
As a Police Officer, I acquired skills in case 
file management and report writing. 
4.00 5.00 4.83 0.38 
As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and 
skills in international police training principles 
that all police officers must uphold basic human 
rights and equal protection of all citizens 
against illegal acts under the law. 
2.00 5.00 4.80 0.51 
The UNMIL training emphasized that police 
operations must encourage citizens to pressure 
their government for their rights under the law. 
1.00 5.00 3.41 1.37 
During the UNMIL training, I acquired 
knowledge that police power must be guided by 
the rule of law, not orders from public officials. 
1.00 5.00 4.63 0.74 
During the UNMIL training, I acquired 
knowledge about the major role of police 
officers during national political elections. 




G2, a human rights lawyer and also former Solicitor-General of Liberia who later 
taught criminal procedure at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this 
view and observed that the trainers came from various legal jurisdictions with different 
policing traditions. For instance, in some of these jurisdictions, “police observance of 
human rights and the rights of the accused is of lower standards than others.” He also 
pointed out for example that the application of the Miranda Rights principle is not 
something that is universal, and some countries do not observe it.  They do not observe it 
decidedly because Miranda came from the American jurisdiction and not all of the 
common law countries practice it. Moreover, policing practices in some jurisdictions are 
influenced by their political traditions. He pointed out that at one point for instance, the 
head of UNMIL’s training program at the Liberia National Police Academy was a 
Ukrainian woman and Ukrainian trainers were part of UNMIL’s core team of trainers. 
However, “their political tradition come from the communist rule of the Soviet Union and 
many of them were trained in the Soviet police tradition.” This was one of the major 
confusions in the training program because the Liberia National Police “have not been 
trained under a uniform criminal justice system and tradition.” UN4 supported this view 
and acknowledged that the policing jurisdiction in Liberia is historically patterned after 
the American model and the UNMIL’s intervention should have recognized that reality: 
 “I believe that many of these trainers who come have British police training; and 
 only few countries in the world have American training. So this for me is the 
 conflict. For me, mentors should understand that this area is America-specific 




On the issue of the nature and course content of the training, two interview 
respondents expressed the view that training was limited in content. For example, 
according to PO2, “The UNMIL’s curriculum did not cover subjects like discipline and 
courtesy, city and county geography, diplomatic immunity, forensics and defensive 
tactics.” This view is shared by Friedman (2011), who argued that the UNMIL trainers 
used materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training 
situations in Kosovo and later in East Timor. According to Freidman (2011), the training 
manuals used by the UNMIL between 2004 through 2006 also did not cover subjects on 
ethics, discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. 
Respondents also stated that subjects covered were not discussed in-depth because the 
training periods were short. From the onset, the training was largely fast tracked and 
lasted about three months. On the average, trainers from different police jurisdictions 
took turns conducting training on a bi-weekly basis.  
Another critical theme that emerged was that the UNMIL’s training lacked 
country-specific policing guidelines for Liberia. Respondents expressed the view that the 
diversity or broadness of the base of trainers also diminished training content and police 
on the job performance. According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the 
Government of Liberia’s police administration to develop training contents and to 
identify specific local skills, policing principles, culture, and guidelines, around which 
UNMIL’s training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. Furuzawa (2009) argued 
that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be 




Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) who argued that international police training programs must 
be implemented in ways that enable individual states “to be able to create their own 
versions of policing based on standards embedded in democratic principles while 
tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9).  
Responses from police participants also revealed that the Government of Liberia was less 
involved in the recruitment (Table 15: M= 2.75) and in exercising oversight (Table 15: 
M=2.18) to ensure that training was coordinated and its content was country-specific. The 
training was conducted with little coordination between UNMIL and Government of 
Liberia or between trainers from the various contributing countries who provided training 
to recruits at the academy. However, the interview participants argued that UNMIL alone 
should not take responsibility for this situation, but rather the Government of Liberia. 
They argued that the Government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to take 
ownership of the training program and did not provide much needed leadership and 
direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. The idea was 
that first they needed to conducting training needs assessment based on the country’s own 
policing principles, guidelines and code. PO1, a former Commissioner of Police for 
Administration and Professional Standards underscored this point:   
 “The Government does not see the LNP as its responsibility. It sees the LNP as a 
 responsibility of the international community, because it’s the international 
 community that started this whole idea of restructuring and reform and then they 
 put the money into it . . . the Government of Liberia through the Liberian National 




 available by the donating country; and in most cases they sent their own experts. 
 And so if you look at the Liberian National Police today, the entire force received  
 different trainings – some received Jordanian training, some from Nepal, some 
 from Pakistan, some from Nigeria, Ghana, some from America, it depended on 
 whatever fund was available.”  
 After 2006, different trainers continued to conduct training based on the values of 
their own police jurisdictions. UN2 acknowledged that values are important and vary 
within the police force of each jurisdiction. He argued however, that although trainers 
brought their own set of values from their various jurisdictions, they used police training 
manuals based on the Liberian Penal Code. G1, G2, G3, and CSO4 disagreed. They 
argued that while the Liberian Penal Code was used, manuals produced and utilized on 
the various topics covered were not Liberia-specific because to that date, UNMIL had not 
involved the Ministry of Justice in the development of a comprehensive training manual 
for the Liberian National Police. G2, made the following observations about UNMIL 
police training manuals:    
 “I was trying to teach from a material produced by UNMIL on criminal procedure 
 and like they just took it from the Internet. Somewhere there I saw “federal” and I 
 said we don’t have federal here. So the training manual needs to be properly 
 developed with the aid of the Justice Ministry . . . because at the end of the day 
 police work affects what the lawyers, and the prosecutors do. The collection of 
 evidence is based on the kind of training they received from different people who 




 Ministry of Justice to develop training manual . . . We are a common law country 
 but we have a different jurisdiction so we need that because some of the capacity 
 problem in the police is based upon the nature of the training that they receive. I 
 think it is a fundamental issue that the justice system has to get over. We have to 
 have a uniform training manual.”    
UN1 concurred with the view that Liberia did not have its own set of local policing 
principles and guidelines, which would identify specific skills around which UNMIL’s 
training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. He cautioned that: 
  “My experience in other missions and in Sierra Leone where we had police 
 reform is that when police come from different parts of the world, they are 
 influenced by different doctrines and how that is coordinated locally to deliver 
 their training is something that maybe needs to be  looked at carefully; and if the 
 country also does not have its own policing principles and guidelines it could 
 create the room for controversies and in the end it may lead to Liberia not having 
 a kind of unified code for police.”   
CSO4, CSO5 and CSO6 concurred with this view and reiterated that acquisition and use 
of local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and needed to be captured 
and taught. CSO4 maintained that:   
 “I think this is what has been absent in most of the interventions not just the 
 interventions with the police, of course we are talking about police now. I think in 
 most of the interventions how we did things here before, the real use of local 




 what we have seen coming from the UN and the international circles.  Most of the 
 lessons learned have to come from outside. That’s true we want standards but we 
 also supposed to recognize our uniqueness as a country. We have a particular 
 context and a particular history and that should be the basis upon which we should 
 do all of these interventions.”  
In 2006, UNMIL determined there was a need to revise its approaches to police 
reform interventions in Liberia. According to Freidman (2011), some of its training 
coordinators had resolved that the curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that 
it favored producing a large number of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum 
was more suited for training of interim police officers than for the development of a 
sustainable long-term police force. Since 2006, UNMIL revised and updated its training 
curriculum with manuals that covered subjects on democratic policing, human rights and 
international policing principles, criminal investigation, community policing concepts, 
case file management, and report writing. It also covered subjects on police 
administration, policies and procedures, ethics, and discipline reflecting best practices. 
Before that time however, UNMIL had trained and deployed 2000 police officers who 
did not benefit from the contents of its revised training curriculum and other new 
program approaches (Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council S/2006/958, 
2006).  
Interview respondents also argued that even some of the revised program 
approaches that UNMIL had determined to implement after 2006 were hampered by its 




through the training of Liberian trainers. However, the new officers trained and deployed 
by UNMIL lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers. According to 
G1, UNMIL’s efforts were also hampered by decisions it had made from the onset to 
deactivate all former ranking officers of the old LNP, although many of them had not 
committed human rights abuses, and they possessed significant experiences to serve as 
future trainers. G1 explained:  
“We even argued that . . . you need to have people with more experience; some 
 old hands in the business to be here to serve as mentors of these people. But 
 UNMIL refused. They recruited people entirely new; many of them young people 
 who had been involved into all kinds of things.”   
The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices improved and became more thorough 
between 2006 and 2013, although its overall reform program was also still not locally 
owned. The training manuals still did not include materials specific to policing operations 
in Liberia. Trainers still came in from the West African region and from different 
policing jurisdictions around the world.  
The impact of the UNMIL’s training on the LNP was also assessed in the context 
of citizens’ perception of training acquired based on demonstrated performance including 
fair and impartial treatment of all citizens. Police and civil society respondents in the 
survey agreed that an effective national police force was crucial for maintaining law and 
order (Table 18: M=4.6). However, the perception of civil society respondents regarding 
police training was that the performance of the UNMIL trained police did not reflect 






Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Police Participants (n= 60) 
 
 Low High Mean* Std. 
Deviat
ion 
An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial for maintaining 
law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. 
1.00 5.00 4.67 0.86 
Crime rates are still high today 1.00 5.00 2.98 1.17 
Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia National Police 
do not respond to crime scenes effectively. 
1.00 5.00 2.78 1.21 
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond timely to crime 
scenes. 
1.00 6.00 4.32 0.98 
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police 
is more related to the lack of authority to bear arms. 
1.00 5.00 2.95 1.41 
The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police 
is more related to the lack of equipment. 
1.00 5.00 4.70 0.65 
Residents of the local communities do not trust the LNP 1.00 5.00 2.75 1.19 
A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a complaint 
against a police officer to his or her superiors. 
1.00 5.00 2.43 1.23 
The Liberia National police used excessive force during the 
elections incident involving some members and supporters of the 
CDC political party on November 8, 2011. 
1.00 5.00 2.72 1.34 
Some members of the Liberia National Police were involved in 
some of the crimes committed today in the country. 
1.00 5.00 4.37 0.66 
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt. 1.00 5.00 3.83 1.12 
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than Police before 
the civil war. 
1.00 5.00 2.20 1.04 
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than the Police before 
the civil war. 
1.00 5.00 3.48 1.00 
The problem of corruption in the police is more related to poor 
salary and lack of benefits for officers. 
2.00 5.00 4.78 0.61 
The Liberia National Police today is not effective and capable to 
maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. 
1.00 5.00 3.68 1.49 
     
5.  Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= 







Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Civil Society Participants (n= 60) 
 




An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial 
for maintaining law and order after UNMIL leaves 
Liberia 
1.00 5.00 4.50 0.81 
The performance of the UNMIL trained police 
shows that they acquired the needed knowledge and 
capacity for effective police work. 
1.00 5.00 2.56 1.28 
Crime rates are still high today. 1.00 5.00 3.67 1.23 
Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia 
National Police do not respond to crime scenes 
effectively. 
1.00 5.00 4.00 1.07 
I trust that the Liberia National Police are able to 
effectively respond to crime in my neighborhood. 
1.00 5.00 2.07 1.09 
If I noticed a crime being committed in my 
neighborhood, I prefer to call my neighbor first before  
I call the Liberia National Police. 
1.00 5.00 4.40 1.03 
I feel more secured in the community in which I live 
because of the professional job the Liberia National 
Police is doing. 
1.00 4.00 2.05 0.82 
The Liberia National Police are not able to respond 
timely to crime scenes. 
1.00 5.00 4.50 0.83 
The Liberia National Police today are likely to 
protect the government more than the citizens. 
1.00 5.00 4.18 0.98 
The problem with effective response of the Liberia 
National Police is more related to the lack of authority 
to bear arms. 
1.00 5.00 2.95 1.42 
The problem with effective response of the Liberia 
National Police is more related to the lack of 
equipment. 











Residents of the local communities do not trust the 
Liberia National Police. 




A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a 
complaint against a police officer to his or her 
superiors. 
1.00 5.00 4.02 1.10 
The Liberia National Police Officers do not treat all 
citizens fairly and impartially when they investigate 
cases. 
2.00 5.00 4.30 0.77 
Some members of the Liberia National Police were 
involved in some of the crimes committed today in the 
country. 
2.00 5.00 4.53 0.65 
The Liberia National police used excessive force 
during the elections incident involving some members 
and supporters of the Congress for Democratic Change 
political party on November 8, 2011. 
1.00 5.00 3.38 1.11 
The Liberia National Police today are corrupt. 1.00 5.00 4.50 0.68 
Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than 
Police before the civil war. 
1.00 5.00 3.44 1.18 
Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than 
Police before the civil war. 
1.00 5.00 2.54 1.16 
The problem of corruption in the police is more 
related to salary and lack of benefits for officers. 
1.00 5.00 4.57 0.74 
The Liberia National Police today is not effective 
and capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL 
leaves Liberia. 
1.00 5.00 3.90 1.33 
     
5.  Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4= 












Police Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference Point  
 
 Low High Mean* Std. 
Deviation 
a) Do you believe that the crime rate 
today is higher, lower or about the 
same than in the years between 2004-
2005? 
1.00 3.00 2.03 0.32 
b) Do you believe that the crime rate 
today is higher, lower or about the 
same than in the years between 2006-
2007? 
1.00 3.00 2.03 0.32 
c) Do you believe that the crime rate 
today is higher, lower or about the 
same than in the years between 2008-
2009? 
1.00 3.00 2.02 0.43 
d) Do you believe that the crime rate 
today is higher, lower or about the 
same than in the years between 2010-
2011? 
1.00 4.00 1.60 0.67 
     



















Civil Society Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference 
  




a) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is 
higher, lower or about the same than in the years 
between 2004-2005? 
1.00 3.00 2.17 0.56 
b) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is 
higher, lower or about the same than in the years 
between 2006-2007? 
1.00 3.00 2.10 0.66 
c) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is 
higher, lower or about the same than in the years 
between 2008-2009? 
1.00 3.00 2.02 0.70 
d) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is 
higher, lower or about the same than in the years 
between 2010-2011? 
1.00 3.00 1.78 0.74 
     
5.  Mean values: 1= about the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher 
 
The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to 
effectively conduct policing operations and maintain law and order. The regression based 
on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a significant relationship between 
knowledge gained and police job performance (Table 22). This meant that police job 
performance is the result of the training acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police 
training effected some relative changes related to the maintenance of law and order. This 
significant relationship further implies that police effectiveness would be higher if their 






 Table 22 
 
Relationship Between Police Knowledge, Skills Level and Job Performance 
 




Police Knowledge and skills level 
Police Job Effectiveness Perceived by Police 
60 4.50 (.31) 
3.31 (.44) 
-.35** .008 
** Correlation is statistically significant at p ≤ .01 
   
Table 23 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA
a) 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1.426 1 1.426 7.587 .008b 
Residual 10.522 56 .188   
Total 11.948 57    
a. Dependent Variable: Police Job performance perceived by police 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Computed police knowledge and skills competency 
 
 
Effectiveness of job performance was measured in the context of (a) the ability of 
the UNMIL trained police to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia; (b) 
Police protection of citizens and government; and (c) Citizens’ trust of police to bear 
arms in order to effectively fight crime. Police survey respondents neither disagreed nor 
agreed (Table 18: M=3.68) that the UNMIL trained police was capable to maintain law 
and order when UNMIL leaves Liberia at the end of its mission. Civil society survey 
respondents also neither disagreed nor agreed (Table 19: M=3.90). However, a majority 
of interview respondents expressed the view that they did not believe that the Liberia 




point to challenges in UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting process, need for psycho-social 
counseling, additional training to increase the size of the police to the population and to 
improve the character of the police, resources and improved conditions of work, and the 
need to build a people-oriented police force as preconditions to ensure performance 
effectiveness after UNMIL leaves Liberia. UN4 emphasized that the question of the 
capability of the LNP to take the place of UNMIL: 
 “Means that you need to build a people-oriented police . . . . For example if you 
 recruit me into the police, send me to the community I came from, it is very 
 difficult for me to halt people in my community. Because they know me . . . and I 
 want to prove to them that I am here to serve you, but . . . I am going to be firm, 
 and they understand that . . . So that’s one approach to make the police more 
 people oriented, more people focused. For this I don’t think they have achieved. 
 So before UNMIL leaves, if they can cover that gap, then to a large extent there 
 will be respect for the police, and the police will also respect the citizens. Number 
 two, I still believe the number of the police to the population is still small. 
 Number three I think equipment is very, very vital, not necessarily weapons, 
 because weapons have a way of providing false confidence to the carrier . . .” 
  On the issue of police protection, civil society respondents agreed that the police 
are likely to protect government more than citizens (Table 19: M=4.18). PO2 expressed 
the view that the culture by which police power is applied in the interest of the state or on 
orders of public officials for political ends (Sawyer, 1992) has not changed: “Nothing has 




which is state-centric and not people-centric. So the police will protect the government 
more than the people.” G2 cited an example in which high school students staged a 
peaceful protest on March 22, 2011 in solidarity with their teachers who were on strike 
for lack of payment of their salaries. Attempts by police to quell the protest resulted in 
use of excessive force by which several students were brutalized, leaving some students 
with serious injuries. According to G2, “one of them, a handicap student took fifteen 
stitches on her head.” The Commission set up to investigate the incident recommended 
that several senior police officers who were involved should be dismissed and some 
should be suspended. G2, who chaired the Commission that investigated the incident and 
made the recommendations, said that when the President of Liberia received the report, 
“she thought that the recommendations were harsh.” G2 took the President’s expression 
to mean that “at the highest level, the President must have felt that the police acted in the 
interest of the government, to protect government’s image; because protests of students in 
the streets shouting ‘pay our teachers’ was an anti-government protest.”  UN4 expressed 
the view that the behavior of the police is often impacted by a fear of consequences:  
 “One must first understand and be trained to that level that if I stand on the 
 citizens’ side, the state will support; the citizens will support. What are the 
 consequences of me supporting the citizens rather than the state? So the fear of 
 consequences alone is a deterrence to make the police more on the government 
 side.”  
PO4 concurred and explained that “most police officers are afraid of losing their job, so 




expressed the view that there have been cases in which the police have been seen taking 
the side of the government when the situation involved citizens from different political 
parties other than the ruling party. CSO2 argued that “The Police Director and most of 
the people in the police force are appointed by the president and can be dismissed by the 
President . . . so that keeps the police tied to the Chief Executive . . . and they are going to 
protect people in the government more than the they will protect the citizens.”  
The sub-components of effectiveness on job performance were public confidence and 
police conduct. Public confidence measured the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the 
ability of the police to provide fair, impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the 
exercise of police authority, and to respond effectively and timely to crime. Police 
conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which impact on police 
integrity. 
On public confidence or the fair and impartial treatment of citizens in the exercise 
of police authority, civil society respondents agreed (Table 19) that they do not get fair 
and impartial treatment from the police: (a) when they investigate their cases (M=4.30); 
(b) when they file complaints against police officers to their superiors (M=4.02).  These 
views were corroborated by interview respondents. However, they also argued that most 
often this was the result of interference from superior officers. CSO6 expressed the view 
that it depends on who is involved:  
“if it is between a government official and you, it is not fairly done because they 
 prioritize. But if it is you against your colleague, because I have witnessed some, 




 but sometimes there is interference by calls from somewhere above telling them 
 to let that person go; calls from above from senior police officers in the central 
 office or sometimes from higher cabinet ministers.”   
The extent of public confidence in the police was also measured in the context of 
police responses to crime. Police officers who participated in the survey agreed that 
despite the knowledge and skills acquired as the result of the UNMIL’s training, they 
were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes and crime scenes (Table 18: 
M=4.32); although they disagreed that crime rates are still high today (M=2.98); and they 
linked this problem to lack of equipment (M= 4.70). Civil society survey respondents 
strongly agreed with the police assessment that the police do not respond effectively to 
crimes and crime scenes (Table 19: M= 4.50). They did not link this problem to the 
police’s lack of authority to bear arms (M= 2.95) but rather to the lack of equipment (M= 
4.33). However, interview respondents G1 and CSO5 argued that the issue of the lack of 
equipment does not apply in all cases and should not be used as an excuse. G1 stressed 
the point that “You can’t say for such a crime as murder, that because I don’t have a 
vehicle so I can’t go to investigate . . .” CSO5 concurred, arguing that “So everybody just 
sit down and make that excuse about equipment. Yes, we know equipment is very key . . . 
to do evidence gathering, forensic and all of that . . . but what were we doing in the past?  
So we shouldn’t just use it as excuse to cover up for our inefficiencies.” UN4 concurred 
and made a distinction between police roles. He argued that while some police roles 
require equipment, there are most other roles “that require just presence, policemen 




all the weapons in the world. You just need the numbers and people carrying out shifts; 
so you need human resources there.” G3, CSO6, and PO1 argued that when you train a 
police force and deploy them to undertake the task of maintaining law and order, 
equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the 
support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, “you must give them the 
tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of 
the training that support effective performance in the field. According to G3,  
“The police have been trained in forensic investigation; but they do not have the 
 equipment to carry out those forensic investigations . . . some travel abroad and 
 train in properly equipped laboratories; they come back to Liberia, there are no 
 laboratories . . . if you transfer police officers from one county to another, they do 
 not have barracks where to stay. They have to go and pay rent; and the rent is 
 coming from their basic salary. There is no rent allowance; there is no housing 
 allowance; there is no transport allowance. They have to beg to take car to get to 
 work. It is unfair to the police.”  
Civil society survey respondents also agreed that crime rates are lower today compared to 
earlier years, but agreed that crime rates today are still high because police do not 
respond timely and effectively to crimes in their neighborhoods (Table 21: M=4.00). In 
the event of a crime in progress, respondents also agreed they prefer to call their 
neighbors first before they call the police (Table 19: M=4.40). The majority of interview 
respondents agreed with this view. They point to the development of neighborhood watch 




to UN3, however, poor organization and lack of control over these groups also led to 
proliferation of mob actions or “street justice” in the neighborhoods.  
 G2 also reasoned that the value in calling one’s neighbor first is also that your 
neighbor “provides your first line of evidence, at least somebody will see something 
happening to you so when the police comes later on, whenever they get to you at least 
you have someone to corroborate what you say happened to you.”  Respondents, who 
indicated the view that they would call the police first, reasoned that the police are 
responsible to enforce the law. According to CSO6,  
 “Your neighbor will do it family way. And if for instance I found somebody 
 raping my child, I call the neighbor, they will say let’s settle it the family way. 
 But the police will be able to apprehend that person, put that whole case under 
 control and see how best they can take your case to court”.  
The issue was also raised on the need for the police to be authorized to carry arms in 
order to carry out effective police operations. On this issue, civil society respondents 
agreed that the problem with effective response of the police is related to a lack of 
equipment (Table 19: M=4.33). However, equipment did not include arms. Respondents 
disagreed that police should bear arms in order to do effective police work. Police 
respondents concurred with this view (Table 18: M=2.25) that they did not need arms in 
order to do effective police work. Interview respondents agreed with the views of police 
and civil society respondents. They also indicated that they did not trust their police to 
bear arms because of the vetting process which allowed former combatants and criminals 




Police conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which 
impacted on police integrity and public confidence. Police conduct was measured in the 
context of corruption and crime. Interview respondents defined corruption as unethical 
behaviors and practices such as drinking, taking of drugs while on duty, collection of 
bribes from motorists, parties to investigations and to court cases involving presentation 
of evidence by the police, all of which have negative impact on police integrity and 
public confidence. The police has not broken away from its discredited past. Analysis of 
responses from the survey questionnaire, interviews, documents, and field notes revealed 
that the UNMIL training had no impact on police integrity. On the issue of crime, police 
respondents agreed that police officers have been involved in some of the crimes 
committed around the country (Table 18: M=4.18). Civil society respondents agreed with 
the police assessment (Table 19: M=4.53). Police and civil society respondents linked 
this result to UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices. On the issue of corruption, 
police and civil society respondents agreed that the Liberia National Police are corrupt. A 
culture of corruption is sustained by a culture of unfavorable conditions of work. 
However, police and civil society respondents linked police corruption more to 
unfavorable working conditions such as poor salary, lack of transportation, and benefits 
such as housing, medical care, and pension programs for officers.  
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between 
knowledge gained and police job performance, meaning that the police job performance 
is the result of the training acquired (Table 23). The implication is that the UNMIL has 




and field locations. However, this does not necessarily imply that the LNP  have adequate 
logistics and other resources needed to enable them perform effectively. Other conditions 
of service, complementary to training, include salary, benefits, equipment, and resources. 
These are fundamental factors of effective performance that enable the police to respond 
effectively to crime scenes and to calls from communities for protection. Respondents 
G1, PO2, and CSO6 argue that better conditions of service including salary and benefits 
is one of the fundamental factors of motivation, especially in Liberia where poverty is on 
the increase.  
Research Question 3  
Are there current challenges that require reform to improve the quality of policing and 
ensure a reliable police security force in Liberia?  
 This question sought to assess the critical lessons learned from responses to 
Research Questions 1 and 2 regarding the UNMIL’s training program and how the 
findings point to challenges that require reforms in order to improve the quality of 
policing in Liberia. Question 3 also explored challenges perceived by the citizens about 
their new police force and what respondents believed must be done to build a 
professional police force capable of providing equal protection to all citizens, while 
upholding their basic human rights and maintaining law and order. The findings in 
Research Questions 1 and 2 point to several internal and external challenges in UNMIL’s 
training program. These challenges were examined from two perspectives: (a) The 




 From the perspective of the UNMIL, challenges that required reform were 
examined from three angles: (a) recruitment decisions; (b) local content; and (c) training 
methodology. The key findings in the UNMIL’s recruitment decisions are that it failed to 
observe established UN mission standards for recruitment and vetting, to communicate 
the message to the population that the new police being organized was for individuals 
with good character, and that policing is for individuals with records of good conduct and 
behavior. UNMIL failed to consult the population in the local communities in the 
recruitment process. Although it posted pictures of candidates around the country and 
asked citizens to speak out and point individuals who had committed human rights 
abuses, UNMIL did not provide the needed security protection to encourage their 
participation in the vetting of candidates. Moreover, the UNMIL’s preference for quantity 
in recruitment of large numbers of candidates compromised quality in the context of 
establishing a sustainable long-term police force. All of these were the additional adverse 
impacts on the outcome of the training program.  
I found that the majority of respondents emphasized their concern about the 
UNMIL’s controlling influence over the program from the onset. According to G1 and 
PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training 
program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions. 
They cited as an example, the decision taken by UNMIL to deactivate and disband the 
entire old Liberian National police force and to build a police force that is entirely new. 
The challenge that this created was the absence of institutional knowledge and memory 




new officers. All of these were the additional adverse impacts on the outcome of the 
training program. The UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts had argued unsuccessfully in 
favor of retention of some of the ranking officers in the old disbanded force. They had 
argued that some of the ranking officers of the old police force who had not committed 
human rights abuses should be retained to serve as mentors for the new recruits. The 
challenges from these lapses were: (1) individuals who committed heinous crimes against 
the population were recruited and are now serving in the new police force with some 
serving as ranking officers, and this also impacts on the morale of the rank-and-file; (2) 
some police officers trained and deployed have been involved in crimes around the 
country for which the citizens do not trust their police; and (3) there was a lack of 
effective leaders in the new police force who can provide leadership by example. The 
rank-and-file admittedly engaged in corrupt activities, while some senior commanders 
frequently interfered in investigations for social, financial and political ends. Still, others 
are caught engaging crimes such as drug trafficking.  
On the issue of local content, respondents indicated their concern that courses 
taught by UNMIL at the academy did not include country-specific contents for Liberia. 
According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the government’s security sector 
regime to develop and include course contents that have specific local skills and policing 
guidelines around which UNMIL’s training activities would revolve. Training manuals 
used in earlier missions and brought to Liberia were not revised to adapt to the country’s 




 Another critical theme that emerged was the UNMIL’s training methodology. The 
earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program, in addition to the recruitment 
challenges, were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the training. 
Trainers came from different countries with diverse social and political backgrounds and 
contrasting policing jurisdictions. The research found that as the result of the broadness 
of the base of trainers and the restricted course content, the overall output of the 
UNMIL’s police training was not country-specific to Liberia and that police trained and 
deployed have different policing orientations and values.  
From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, challenges that required 
reform were examined from three angles: (a) UNMIL-GoL coordination challenges; (b) 
GoL support to police reform and capacity challenges; and (c) political interference in 
policing operations. Analysis of the survey results, transcripts from the interviews, 
documents and field notes revealed that the support of the Government of Liberia is 
complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure effectiveness of 
performance. However, the findings reflect that the government’s direct support in this 
regard had been minimal, instead it had relied on international donor support. On the 
issue of political interference, respondents expressed concern over the government’s 
continued control over the administration of the police through political appointment of 
ranking officers. The President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals 
appointed are most often not from within the organization. Internal promotions have also   




these factors have historically demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded 
motivation, and adversely impacted on the development of a professional police force.  
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 4, I analyzed the data, discussed the research results and presented the 
findings. The overarching research question that guided this study was: How has police 
training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public 
confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order? This question was 
expanded by two qualitative questions and one quantitative question. In Research 
Question 1, I assessed the UNMIL’s strategy for recruitment and vetting of applicants for 
the new LNP, in the context of thoroughness applied in the process to ensure that only 
applicants who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good 
behavior in the local communities were recruited. The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting 
procedures were not thorough and did not adhere to United Nations international police 
reform standards. In Research Question 2, I assessed training and citizens’ perception of 
training based on observed police performance. The training was not uniform and did not 
include a country-specific context for Liberia. The broadness of the base of trainers from 
diverse and contrasting police jurisdictions diminished training effectiveness and 
undermined the effectiveness of performance of the police. Participants’ responses to 
Research Question 3 affirmed that there were current challenges that required reform to 
establish a professional police force that is in synch with its policing jurisdiction and is 
effective and capable of maintaining law and order in Liberia. The LNP currently faces 




and re-orientation interventions by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia. In Chapter 5, 
I briefly discuss the conclusions and present my recommendations for positive social 





















Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the conclusions based on the findings, critical lessons 
learned, and the recommendations. I conducted the on location in Monrovia, Liberia. I 
conducted the study in the wake of the country’s fight to eradicate the Ebola epidemic 
under conditions of emergency management public policy challenges never before 
experienced in Liberia nor in the West African subregion. Participants in the study were 
from the government, community-based civil society organizations, the LNP, and the UN 
mission in Liberia. The mixed-model research method was used to collect and analyze 
the data. The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the 
UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP 
to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The objective of the 
study was to identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the 
establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the 
citizens of Liberia. 
I can conclude, based on the findings, that the UNMIL’s police training program 
has yielded mixed results and impacts on the effectiveness of police performance in 
Liberia. The deficiencies in the UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions reflect 
a broader problem of shortcomings in various reform programs implemented by the UN 
and other international nongovernmental organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) 
emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of reform programs are 




effective coordination amongst implementing agencies, and their failure to engage 
Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs. In the case of 
UNMIL, the police training program took place in a new global environment under 
country-specific realities and conditions that informed how training intervention for the 
LNP ought to have happened in order to establish a country-specific professional police 
force that gains local ownership. In an analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire, 
interview transcripts, and field notes, I found that the UNMIL training of the LPN was 
impacted by what Durch (2010) referred to as a “crisis of strategy” from the onset (p. 8). 
Respondents emphasized that UNMIL was not well-informed about its mission 
environment in Liberia and did not seek much needed guidance from the local security 
sector regime. 
The adverse impacts, however, are not entirely training related but result also 
from negative externalities emanating from the behavior of the government of Liberia 
towards its police force. Policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an 
entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not 
place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and 
administration even in its postconflict state. The future implications of the results are that 
the UNMIL and the government of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a 
comprehensive program of professionalizing the police before the UNMIL’s departure 
from Liberia. They must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and 




system and policing tradition, which is specifically patterned after that of the United 
States.  
The conclusions and recommendations are presented in two parts based on 
Research Questions 1 and 2. Question 3 was a restatement of the critical lessons learned 
and the challenges that informed the recommendations. In each part, the findings are 
summarized to provide the basis for the conclusions and the recommendations for 
positive social change based on each research question from the perspectives of (a) the 
UNMIL and (b) the government of Liberia.  
Research Question 1 
What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?  
The UNMIL Perspective 
  In the findings for Question 1, I found that the UNMIL’s approach to recruitment 
and vetting of candidates was adhoc. Candidates were not investigated with due diligence 
regarding their character and previous human rights records. The UNMIL’s recruitment 
and vetting practices were not exhaustive. The procedures were not thorough and did not 
adhere to the standards applied in other UN police reform missions such as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo. Citizens in the local communities were not 
consulted in the vetting process regarding prior behaviors and character of applicants. In 
conclusion, UNMIL’s failure to apply due diligence in the recruitment of candidates 
resulted in the admission of known criminals and former combatants of the warring 
factions who had committed human rights abuses during the civil war. To date, they 




On the issue of police integrity, I also found that psychological counseling was 
needed as part of the training package because the country was just emerging from 14 
years of conflict from which the people were traumatized. Former combatants, criminals, 
and individuals with questionable character had found their way into the rank-and-file of 
the new police force and some had even become supervisors. In Question 1, I further 
concluded that the admission of former combatants, criminals, and individuals with 
questionable character was partly responsible for the citizens’ lack of trust in the new 
police to bear arms. It also bears on a crisis of public confidence in the integrity of the 
police as an instrument for peace-building given that some of the UNMIL trained officers 
were found to be involved in various crimes, such as armed robberies and drug 
smuggling around the country.   
The Government Perspective 
From the perspective of the government, the participants also raised the critical 
issue of the weak commitment by the government to its police training program. PO1, 
PO2, and G3 argued that the government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to 
take ownership of the UNMIL training program to provide much needed leadership and 
direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. In the view of 
respondents, taking ownership meant providing funding for the training or for some 
aspects of it instead of relying entirely on the international community. Had the 
government committed to taking ownership of the training program, it would have been 
able to insist on country-specific training and orientation. That is, it would have been in 




would accept for the LNP and which training it would reject. To the contrary, the 
government compromised its position by failing to take responsibility for its police 
training program. It had to accept whatever training was available based on funding 
provided by any given country.  
Recommendation 1 
 The United Nations must require future postconflict international police reform 
missions to: 
(a) Ensure that joint efforts in recruitment and vetting must go beyond consultations 
with officials of the local security sector regime to ascertain participation of local 
community-based civil society members in an inclusive process of postconflict 
police and security sector reform; 
(b) Emphasize participation of the local communities in the vetting of candidates for 
the police force and provide immediate security and protection for the citizens as 
the basis for their participation in the vetting of candidates;  
(c) Communicate recruitment standards through local languages, while articulating 
the need for applicants with good character; inform residents in the local 
communities that police applicants should be people who have good character and 
good human rights backgrounds; and  
(d) In the case of Liberia, UNMIL and the government of Liberia must jointly 
implement a periodic and revolving program of psychological counseling and 
rehabilitation for all members of the current police force. This should include the 





A key component of any international reform intervention is a strong partnership 
and effective coordination between the mission and the local authorities to jointly provide 
program direction and support. In the findings to question 1, participants raised the issue 
of the UNMIL’s controlling influence over the training program. According to G1 and 
PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training 
program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions. 
For example, participants referred to the case of UNMIL’s decision to deactivate the 
entire old LNP and to build a police force that is entirely new. On this issue, UNMIL’s 
Liberian implementing partners had requested that some of the ranking officers of the 
disbanded old police who had not committed human rights abuses should be retained to 
serve as mentors for the new recruits. Respondents emphasized that UNMIL refused and 
none of the ranking officers of the old disbanded police was recruited. However, the 
literature supports the position of the UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts. A study by 
Glebbeek (2001) on police reform in Guatemala showed that the process did not succeed 
and faced significant challenges because it involved a decision to abolish the entire old 
police force and to establish a new force bereft of members of the old institution. In 
contrast, a similar police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El 
Salvador found that the strategy for building a new police force from bottom-up was 
successful because it provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by 
the inclusion of some members of the old police force. In conclusion, I found in Question 




disbanded LNP to ensure continuity would have been a successful strategy. This strategy 
was adopted by UN police training missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in East Timor 
and yielded successful results. It should have been adopted by the UNMIL in Liberia. 
The impacts of the failure to provide for institutional memory and organizational 
continuity were reflected in leadership capacity gaps of the new LNP. Respondents 
emphasized the point that as the result of this decision, the LNP lacked capacity in terms 
of experience and the competencies associated with law enforcement leadership such as 
administration of the police revolving around the ability to mentor subordinates, exercise 
command and control, and providing overall leadership.  
Recommendation 2 
 
 Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a 
strong partnership and collaboration to integrate, rehabilitate and strengthen what is 
found on the ground in the host country. The mission must collaborate with its local 
counterparts to reform the institution it finds on the ground and to place it in synch with 
contemporary international policing principles and standards. The overall police reform 
goal need not be to disband the structure is found on the ground; but rather to rebuild and 
strengthened it through a jointly developed program of integration, rehabilitation, and re-
orientation specific to the policing needs of the host country.    
Research Question 2 
What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the 
maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force? 




A critical concern raised by respondents was the weak collaborative relationship 
and coordination between the UNMIL and its local police administration counterparts in 
the implementation of the training program. Although a joint transitional team for 
designing and administering the training existed, I found that UNMIL made the final 
decisions that were critical to the direction of the program (Freidman, 2011). In the 
process, the UNMIL did not coordinate its activities with the other implementing partners 
to ensure that the nature and direction of its police training intervention was country-
specific to the context and history of Liberia and to its criminal justice system. This is the 
key challenge which points to the need for additional training, rehabilitation, and re-
orientation to exact this country-specific policing context. In Question 2 I also found that 
course materials and contents were taken from earlier UN missions in other postconflict 
countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo and did not include 
Liberian local content. UN1, CSO4, and G2 argued that UNMIL needed to collaborate 
with the Ministry of Justice to develop a training manual for Liberia. It was important 
that Liberia develops its own unified code and that the use of local policing principles 
and guidelines and local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and 
needed to be captured and taught. 
In the findings to Question 2, respondents raised the issue of UNMIL’s training 
methodology and the nature and content of the training. The UNMIL used a diversity of 
trainers from countries with different political orientations, criminal justice systems, and 
policing methods and traditions. A majority of trainers, including those from Africa, had 




orientation originating from the policing traditions of the Soviet era. The challenge that 
this broadness of the base of trainers posed was recognized in the “Brahimi Report” of 
the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (2000): 
“The police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40 
countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations 
experience, and have received little relevant training on mission-specific 
briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely . . . All of 
those factors make it extremely difficult for missions . . . to transform a disparate 
group of officers into a cohesive and effective force.” (p.20)  
In the case of Liberia, the challenges described in the panel’s report resulted in a training 
outcome that lacked a uniform criminal justice orientation with a country-specific local 
content. Respondents indicated the view that the diversity of trainers from diverse social 
and political backgrounds and contrasting police jurisdictions compromised training 
effectiveness and adversely impacted on the effectiveness of job performance of the 
UNMIL trained LNP. It also failed to situate the training program within the context of 
the country’s history and policing tradition. Liberia is a common law country with a 
criminal justice system and a policing tradition specifically patterned after that of the 
United States of America. Policing in Liberia is based on that particular context and 
history which should have been the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training and 
reform interventions was conducted. UNMIL’s failure in this regard affirmed a 
significant failure to understand its mission environment. It resulted in the major 




tradition. In Research Question 2, I found that the UNMIL established a police force that 
is not harmonized with the policing tradition of Liberia. The LNP today has conflicting 
performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank nomenclatures. This 
failure presents another critical lesson learned for future UN police training missions. The 
conclusion, based on the findings on this issue, is that the practice observed in the 
Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of trainers is drawn from a variety of policing 
jurisdictions based on available donors, should be abolished. Future UN postconflict 
international police training and reform programs must not be donor-driven. Instead, the 
programs must be driven by what is required to implement reforms specific to enhancing 
a host country’s policing needs. That is, trainers must be recruited from countries whose 
policing traditions and jurisdictions are the same as that of the host country. The training 
program must be implemented to exact the outcome specific to policing in that country.    
Recommendation 3 
(a) The future UN postconflict international police training programs must not be 
donor-driven. The programs must be driven by what is required to implement 
reforms specific to enhancing a host country’s policing needs. The mission 
must be guided by a standard of a strong partnership, and collaboration to 
rehabilitate, integrate and strengthen what is found on the ground and not to 
discard it;  
(b) Training materials and contents of courses must be developed and reviewed 




content specific to the context of a country’s history, policing tradition and 
jurisdiction;  and 
(c) As far as practicable, trainers must be recruited from countries whose policing 
traditions and jurisdictions are the same or similar to that of the host country.   
Recommendation 4 
 
(a) Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and a policing 
tradition specifically patterned after that of the United States of America. Policing 
in Liberia is based on that particular context and history, which should have been 
the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training, was conducted. The UNMIL and 
the government of Liberia must embark on a program of retraining, rehabilitation, 
and re-orientation to situate the police in its common law criminal justice system 
and policing tradition with harmonized organization, structure, and rank 
nomenclatures specifically patterned after that of the United States before UNMIL 
departs Liberia;  
(b) Integral to the new program of retraining and re-orientation should be a 
collaborative effort to develop a training manual specific to policing in Liberia. 
Liberia should have its own unified code that is based on its criminal justice 
jurisdiction, and utilizes local policing principles, guidelines and local knowledge 
in handling policing operations; and  
(c) This transformation must take place with UNMIL trained officers serving in the 
highest ranking strategic positions under the watch of UNMIL for some time 




The Government Perspective 
 
From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, I found several externalities 
not directly related to training but which impact on the effectiveness of job performance 
of the LNP. I found that correlations and regression used to test the hypotheses showed a 
moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained 
during UNMIL training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35). 
However, the relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained 
increases, the job performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The 
implication is that as more resources were are used in training the police, limited 
resources were allocated to facilitate their job performance. This formed a basis of 
reducing police effectiveness. Moreover, the regression based on the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job 
performance. This meant that the police job performance is the result of the training 
acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police training effected some relative changes 
related to the maintenance of law and order. This significant relationship further implied 
that police effectiveness would be higher if their capacity regarding questions of 
equipment and resources were adequately provided by the government.  
These findings provide useful insight into the effectiveness of job performance of 
the UNMIL trained police relative to challenges in the context of the government’s 
interventions in its police reform program. In the analysis of the survey results, 
transcripts from the interviews, documents, and field notes I also found that although the 




necessarily imply that the LNP had the logistics and other resources needed to enable 
them perform effectively. Respondents emphasized that the support of the government of 
Liberia was complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure 
effectiveness of performance. However, the findings showed that the government’s direct 
support in this regard had been minimal, and that instead it had relied on international 
donor support. To the contrary, respondents emphasized the view that the government 
ought not to rely on donor support. They expressed the view that the international 
community is committed largely to providing funds for technical training and advisory 
support, and much of its funding goes to that area. It is the government of Liberia that has 
primary responsibility to provide the actual resources and the funding for the police 
institution. The government’s failure to meet this obligation left the UNMIL trained LNP 
as one of those institutions that was seriously underfunded and underpaid. A majority of 
the respondents emphasized that the public’s lack of confidence in the ability of the 
police to maintain law and order is based more on their perception that the government 
had not been forthcoming in providing adequate support to capacitate the police to 
perform its law enforcement duties. PO1, PO2, CSO6, and G3 argued that the 
government of Liberia did not provide the needed support to the police as articulated in 
its Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) and the Agenda for Transformation (2013), and 
that its support was necessary to yield performance effectiveness. They argued that when 
a police force is trained and deployed to undertake the task of maintaining law and order, 
equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the 




tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of 
the training that support effective performance in the field.  
On the question of the ability of the police to maintain law and order after 
UNMIL leaves Liberia, I found that civil society respondents did not believe that the 
LNP was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. Police and civil 
society also agreed that police were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes. 
They linked these to the need for additional training and the lack of equipment and 
resources. Moreover, other conditions of service that are complementary to training 
include salary, benefits, and good working conditions and environment. These are 
fundamental factors of effective performance. In postconflict Liberia where poverty is on 
the increase, police officers are among the least paid with an average monthly salary of 
about one hundred and fifty ($150.00) United States dollars. Out of this salary, they pay 
income tax, transport themselves to work, relocate to distant areas of assignment, pay 
rent, and care for their families.    
In the responses to Question 2, I also found that the UNMIL training had no 
impact on police integrity as evidenced by corruption and unfairness in the exercise of 
police authority. However, police and civil society respondents linked this lack of 
integrity to a culture of unfavorable conditions of work punctuated by factors such as 
poor salary and a lack of benefits such as housing, transportation, medical care, and 
pension programs for officers. This culture of unfavorable conditions of work was also 
linked to low level of attention and handling of the police by the government in all areas 




Another issue which emerged as critical to the need for police reform was 
political interference in police operations and the need to depoliticize the police. 
According to Liebenow (1969), Liberia is a country where “politics is king.” Policing 
takes place in a political environment of an entrenched centralized, imperial presidential 
system.  Political leaders do not place a premium on the mission of the police, and 
therefore on its organization and administration even in its postconflict state. To date, the 
state continues to regard the police organization more as an instrument for exerting state 
control over the citizenry than for the enforcement of laws in the process of postconflict 
democratic peace-building and state-building. According to G2 and G3, the state’s 
control of the police is exercised primarily by its political appointments of all ranking 
officers, and by its control over the finance and expenditure decisions of the police. The 
President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals appointed are most often not 
from within the organization. Internal promotions also had no set criteria and promotions 
are not based on performance, tenure, and merit. All of these factors have historically 
demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded motivation, and adversely impacted on 
the development of a professional police force. 
 In Research Question 2, I also found that in the wake of UNMIL’s drawdown, it 
was critical for Liberia’s political leaders to appreciate the need to place a high premium 
on the mission of the nation’s police force and to act quickly to professionalize it. A 
functioning professional LNP will reduce the risk of conflict and make society safer by 
providing security for all, including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling 




authority and strengthen Liberia’s nascent democracy. The research also found that this 
was the rationale for respondents’ call to depoliticize the police and its operations.   
The call to depoliticize the police institution as much as possible emerged as a 
major dynamic for professionalizing the LNP. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO2 all called for 
restructuring the police such that the LNP becomes semi-autonomous with an 
independent body exercising oversight responsibility over its operations. For example, 
when a vacancy occurs within one of the strategic ranking offices of the police, the 
Commission would vet candidates, establish an eligible list of three successful candidates 
and submit same to the President from which list one candidate is selected to fill that 
vacancy. I advance the following recommendations below based on the findings: 
Recommendation 5  
 5.1 Organization 
(a) Enactment of a new law establishing the new Liberia National Police must be 
based on recommendations for rehabilitation, reorganization, and reorientation of 
the entire LNP, officers, and rank-and-file alike; 
(b) Depoliticize and restructure the police organization. By law, establish the LNP as 
a semi-autonomous institution as far practicable; 
(c) Establish a 5-member Law Enforcement Commission to oversee all aspects of the  
operations of the Liberia National Police; 
(d) Appointment of senior ranking officers of the LNP must be based on merit. Once 




definite period; they should be removed only by process of impeachment through 
the Legislature;   
(e) Line level officers must be promoted based on merit; consider education, 
experience, tenure and meritorious performance; salary increments and 
promotions must be based on results of performance evaluation.  
  5.2 Remuneration 
(f) Establish a pay and grade system based on position classification that begins with 
police entry-level pay and benefits graduated over time periods; consult the Civil 
Service Agency on the position classification and pay starting with line level 
oficers; and 
(g) Abolish the income tax for line level officers earning monthly gross income 
below USD$200.00.  
 5.3 Housing 
(h) New LNP law to be enacted must have a provision requiring construction of 
barracks for police officers throughout the country. Police barracks of 
conventional standard (i.e., West Africa sub-region) must be constructed in all 
county capitals throughout the country; and in populated cities and emerging 
urban areas around the country; 
(i) Housing allowance scheme should be put in place for line level officers assigned 
to areas not having barracks.   




(j) Education: Provide free education to children and dependents of line level police 
officers up to completion of the 12th grade. Free education defined to include free 
registration fees and books;  
(k) Medical: Free medical care in government clinics and hospitals for officers, their 
children and dependents. Free medical care defined to include free registration 
and free laboratory tests; and 
(l)  Insurance: Establish a program to provide free life insurance coverage for line 
level or rank-and file police offiers. 
      
Implications for Social Change 
UN Police Reform Missions  
Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a 
strong partnership, effective coordination and collaboration between the mission, and the 
local security sector regime to jointly provide program direction and support. 
Additionally, the practice observed in the Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of 
trainers is drawn from a variety of policing jurisdictions should be abolished. Future UN 
postconflict international police training missions should be driven by what is required to 
implement training specific to a host country’s policing needs and not by donors.  
The Liberia National Police  
The government of Liberia must take ownership of the UNMIL training program 
to provide much needed leadership and direction. It must recommit to the police training 




government and UNMIL must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and re-
orientate the police and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice 
system and policing jurisdiction, which is specifically patterned after that of the United 
States of America. Another major dynamic of the findings of the research was the clarion 
call for the Government to act quickly to professionalize the Liberia National Police and 
to depoliticize its operations. Respondents emphasized the need to implement a merit-
based system for officers and the rank-and-file, and to restructure the police organization 
as a semi-autonomous institution as far as is practicable before the UNMIL’s departure 
from Liberia. The social change implications of all this is that an effective functioning 
professional LNP will reduce the risk of return to conflict. It will make society safer by 
providing security for all including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling 
environment for investment and sustainable economic growth, development, and social 
stability and enhance state authority while strengthening Liberia’s nascent democracy.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
The LNP operates as a part of the larger criminal justice system of Liberia. 
According to G2, the three tiers of Liberia’s criminal justice system include the police, 
prosecution, and corrections. Police work involves pretrial detentions, evidence 
gathering, and production of admissible evidence to protect the rights of parties in the 
courts. According to the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (2013), Liberia’s courts are laden with judicial inefficiencies. Liberia’s jurors, 
judges, and magistrates are subject of influence and corruption. There is also the issue of 




the judicial system. All of these undermine effective police performance. The 
effectiveness of job performance of the police is somewhat tied to the effectiveness of the 
entire criminal justice system. However, there is no current related judicial reform 
program in place that could be aligned with the ongoing UNMIL police training and 
reform interventions.  Additional research is needed to determine how police reform can 
be implemented as part of a larger program of a holistic criminal justice reform in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of performance of the police in the future.  
Chapter Summary 
This study examined how UNMIL police training affected effectiveness and 
public confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order. A mixed methods 
approach was used. Likert scales were used to collect quantitative data. Qualitative data 
consisted of documentary sources and individual, semi-structured interviews with open-
ended and closed questions. Participants were officials of government, UNMIL, officers 
of LNP, and leaders and members of civil society organizations.  
The UNMIL’s police training yielded mixed results. To the extent that local 
context of policing varies from one country to another, the design and implementation of 
any international police reform assistance program should be based on context-specific 
knowledge and expertise. In the case of Liberia, UNMIL was not well-informed about its 
mission environment. This resulted in the repetition of errors made by earlier police 
reform missions in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor. In Liberia, the 
diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions of different nations yielded a 




Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and policing tradition 
patterned after that of the United States. Liberia’s history and policing context should 
have been the basis upon which the UNMIL training was conducted in order to establish 
a country-specific professional police force that gains local ownership. Instead, the 
UNMIL established a police force that is not harmonized with its policing tradition and 
has conflicting performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank 
nomenclatures.   
I also found that the government of Liberia failed to take ownership of the 
training program and to provide much needed leadership and direction due to its weak 
commitment and inadequate resource support to complement the training. Respondents 
emphasized the view that had the government been committed to taking ownership of the 
training program, it would have been able to insist on country-specific training, 
orientation, and program outcomes. Another issue which emerged as critical to the reform 
was that policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an entrenched 
centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not place a 
premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and 
administration even in its postconflict state. The administration and operation of the 
police remained highly politicized.  
The future implications of these results are that the UNMIL and the government 
of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a comprehensive program of 
retraining, rehabilitation, and reorientation to professionalize and situate the LNP in its 




political leaders should depoliticize the police, grant semi-autonomous status to it, and 
provide adequate resource support. All of the transformation cited above must take place 
with UNMIL trained officers serving in the highest ranking strategic positions under the 
watch of UNMIL for some time before the end of its mission in Liberia. For the UN, 
police training missions should be driven by what is required to implement training 
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AppendixA: List of Acronyms 
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia 
BIN Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECOMOG ECOWAS Military Monitoring Group 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
LINEA Liberia Law Enforcement Association 
LNP Liberia National Police 
LFF Liberia Frontier Force 













Appendix B; Participants’ Recruitment Letters 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: 
                           Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications 
 
RECRUITMENT LETTER (Survey) 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
You are invited to participate in my dissertation research survey of the police training 
provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National 
Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher conducting the 
survey as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in Public Policy. 
The purpose of the survey is to gain better understanding of how police training by 
UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain 
law and order. For this survey, I am seeking the following participants:  
 
 Members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the  
    performance of the LNP in their local communities; and  
 
 Police field officers who have been trained by UNMIL; 
 
Participation in this survey is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will 
also be strictly confidential. No names will be associated with the information you 
provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you choose to have the survey 
conducted.  
 
Please contact me by phone 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu  


















        WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
                  The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: 
                           Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications 
 
RECRUITMENT LETTER (Interview) 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
You are invited to participate in my dissertation research interview in my study of the 
police training provided by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the 
Liberia National Police (LNP). My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I am the researcher 
conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree in 
Public Policy. The purpose of the interview is to gain better understanding of how police 
training by UNMIL has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively 
maintain law and order. For this interview, I am seeking the following participants:  
 
 Leaders of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced  
    the performance of the LNP in their local communities;  
 
 Police supervisors and ranking officers who have been trained by UNMIL; 
 
 Ranking officers and officials of UNMIL; and   
 
 Officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions.  
 
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. All information you will provide will also 
be strictly confidential. Interviews will be audio recorded. No names will be associated 
with the information you provide. You will be allowed to indicate where and when you 
choose to have the interview.  
 
Please contact me by phone 231-886-951-263 or email yarsuo.weh-dorliae@waldenu.edu 














Appendix C: Informed Consent Forms 
                                                WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
   PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM (Interview) 
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: 
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications 
You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The 
researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL 
officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions, 
and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the 
performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being 
conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The 
purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL 
has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and 
order and gain public confidence.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to answer interview 
questions presented by the researcher. Consent form must be signed by you in order for 
the interview to be conducted. You will be asked to:   
• Respond verbally to thirteen (13) interview questions. The interview will be audio 
recorded. Some examples of the questions are: “Do you believe that the Liberia 
National Police today are likely to protect the government more than the 
citizens?” and “Do you trust the Liberia National Police today to bear arms in 
order to do effective police work?  
• The interview will take about one hour to complete. Following the interview, I will 
request that you meet with me later to go over my interpretation and initial impressions of 
what you said in your responses.  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision 
whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are 
still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time. 
  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you 
experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to 




mental health providers is attached to this Consent Form for easy reference. The researcher will 
exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally 
charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when 
you choose to have the interview.  
In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an 
opportunity  
to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of 
the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens’ 
confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform 
programs for future postconflict countries.  
Compensation: 
There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study. 
 
Confidentiality: 
The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be 
published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to 
identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the 
data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be 
used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a 
password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least 
five years as required by the University.  
 
Contacts and Questions: 
The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also 
a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher’s role as a 
commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.  
The researcher’s faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you 
have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886-
951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu.  If you want to talk privately about 
your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden 
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612-
312-1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is 07-30-13-0065268, and 
it expires on July 29, 2014. You will receive a copy of this form from the researcher.  
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT:  
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
decision about my involvement. By signing below, I understand that I am agreeing to the 
terms described above.  




Date of Consent: ____________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature: _______________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature: __________________________ 
 
                                   WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
   PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT FORM (Survey) 
The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: 
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications 
You are invited to take part in a research study of the police training provided by the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the Liberia National Police (LNP). The 
researcher is inviting police officers who have been trained by UNMIL, ranking UNMIL 
officers and officials of the Government of Liberia who participated in training decisions, 
and members of community-based civil society organizations who have experienced the 
performance of the LNP in their local communities to be in the study. This study is being 
conducted by a student named Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae (Researcher), as a partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for his PhD degree in Public Policy at the Walden University. The 
purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of how police training by UNMIL 
has affected the capacity of the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and 
order and gain public confidence.  
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to respond to survey questions 
presented by the researcher. You will be asked to respond to forty-one (41) survey 
questions that will take about 30 minutes to complete. Some examples of the survey 
questions are: “Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect 
the government more than the citizens?” and “Do you trust the Liberia National Police 
today to bear arms in order to do effective police work?  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. The researcher will respect your decision 
whether or not you choose to be in the study. If you initially decide to participate, you are 
still free to change your mind later and withdraw at any time. 
  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
Your participation in this study will pose minimal risk. However, in the event you 
experience stress, you may terminate your participation at any time. You may refuse to 
answer any questions you consider invasive or stressful. A referral list of no-to low-cost 




exhibit sensitivity to guard against a situation of the interview becoming emotionally 
charged. Your privacy will be respected. You will be allowed to indicate where and when 
you choose to have the interview.  
In terms of benefits, if you choose to participate in this study, you will have an 
opportunity  
to express your views and make a major contribution to knowledge about the capacity of 
the Liberia National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain citizens’ 
confidence. Your views will also help the United Nations in planning police reform 
programs for future postconflict countries.  
Compensation: 
There will be no compensation provided for your participation in this study. 
 
Confidentiality: 
The records of this study will be kept private. In any report of this study that might be 
published, the researcher will not include any information that will make it possible to 
identify you. All data are strictly confidential and no names will be associated with the 
data in any way. Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The data will be 
used for the research purposes only. The data will be kept secured electronically with a 
password known only to the researcher. The data will also be kept for a period of at least 
five years as required by the University.  
 
Contacts and Questions: 
The researcher conducting this study is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is also 
a Commissioner of the Governance Commission. However, the researcher’s role as a 
commissioner is not in any way connected to this study.  
The researcher’s faculty advisor is Dr. Donald McLellan. You may ask any questions you 
have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae at 231-886-
951-263 or email yarsuo.wehdorliae@waldenu.edu.  If you want to talk privately about 
your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden 
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 001-612-
312-1210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is _________________, 
and it expires on _______________. You may keep this consent form.  
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT:  
In order to protect your privacy, your signature will not be collected. Your completion of 






Appendix D; Interview Protocol 
WALDEN UNIVERSITY 
 
  The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police: 
Effectiveness, Results and Future Implications 
 
Interview Protocol:   
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. My name is Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae. I 
am conducting this study as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for my PhD degree 
in Public Policy at the Walden University. The purpose of the study is to gain deeper 
understanding of how police training by UNMIL have affected the capacity of the Liberia 
National Police to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. 
 
This interview will take no more than one hour. The interview be audio taped so I can 
properly transcribe all interviews. Also, I will be taking some notes during the session. 
Because we are on tape, please speak clearly so that your comments are heard. All 
responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will not be 
shared with anyone else. I will also ensure that any information you provide for this study 
does not identify you in any way as the respondent. Remember, you do not have to talk 
about anything you don’t want to and you may end the interview at any time. Do you 
have any questions about what I have just explained? 
Are you willing to participate in this interview? 
 
Questions: 
1. Do you believe that if a citizen knew a police recruit who had committed human 
rights abuses he or she will not complain to UNMIL for fear of revenge?  
2. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police today are likely to protect the 
government more than the citizens?  
3. Do you believe that the Liberia National Police Officers treat all citizens fairly 
and impartially when they investigate their cases?  
4. How has UNMIL training impacted on the integrity of the police on the issue of    
corruption?  
5. How has UNMIL training impacted on the effectiveness of the police to collect 
evidence and present accurate records of criminal investigations to protect the 
rights of parties in the courts?    
6. Do the UNMIL trained ranking officers or leaders of the Liberia National Police 
have the knowledge to provide professional leadership to their subordinates?  
7. If you saw a crime being committed in your community, who would you prefer to 




8. Do you believe that UNMIL training was coordinated and subjects covered 
followed country-specific guidelines?  
9. Do you believe that some members of the UNMIL trained Liberia National Police 
were involved in some of the crimes committed around the country?      
10. What do you believe are some of the current challenges facing the Liberia 
National Police?   
11. The mission of UNMIL in Liberia will end on September 30, 2015. Do you 
believe that the Liberia National Police is capable to maintain law and order after 
UNMIL leaves Liberia?   
12. What recommendations do you have to improve the effectiveness of the Liberia 
National police and gain public confidence? 
13. Is there anything more you would like to add? 
 
I will be analyzing the information you and others have given me and I will be contacting 
you to review the transcription in order to ensure accuracy of information and increase 
the validity of the research findings. Thus, you will have the opportunity to review 
transcripts and be offered the opportunity to discuss the transcribed copy of your 
interview. 














































































Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae       Monrovia, Liberia  
                                                           
 
               PROFILE 
 
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae is a career civil servant. He is a public sector human resources 
management professional with more than twenty-five years of proven managerial experience in 
providing executive leadership, planning, program development, project coordination, 
compensation, and staff development. He is a highly analytical generalist who possesses a wide 
range of skills in public sector reform and socio-economic development administration. He 
consistently initiates action and accepts responsibility in exercising professional judgment with 
integrity; maintains outstanding relationship with people and is committed to furthering the 
success of team members. As author and newspaper columnist, Weh-Dorliae has written 




GOVERNANCE COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA 
Commissioner, Political & Legal Reforms/Decentralization, November, 2007 – 
Present:   
Responsible at full performance level, for performing a variety of rotational assignments thinking 
and developing concepts and ideas to strengthen policy development in political and legal reform 
programs; provide policy guidance in the implementation of a system of decentralized 
participatory governance in Liberia;  collaborate with ministries and agencies of the Government, 
United Nations organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations, civil 
society and the citizenry at large and lead public policy development under the Commission’s 
Political and Legal Reforms mandate area. 
 
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
Personnel Analyst, Hiring Services Division, November 9, 1998 – March, 2007:  
Responsible, at full performance level, for performing public personnel work proficiently in all 
areas including job design, assessment and compensation; managing projects involving 
development and implementation of hiring process procedures, policies and regulations; 
collaborating with City administrators, union officials, employees and the public to facilitate 
resolution of hiring issues; Interpreting and applying civil service regulations, laws, policies, 
standards, and procedures; mentoring and training others including new employees. 
 
CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA  
Senior Staff Analyst, Selections Division January 1980 – August 1981  
Developed and supervised administration of written examinations. Responsible for test 
development and security of all examination materials; Conducted job analysis and position 
classification surveys along with colleagues, and coordinating the Agency’s public relations 





CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA  
Research Associate, Selections Division January 1977 – January 1978  
Performed rotational assignments in human resources research support work; provided 
general administrative support in all aspects of human resource development work; 
assisted analysts in conducting job analysis and position classification surveys; work with 
analysts to ensure employment procedures are followed, and  perform rotational 
personnel development work  assignments.  
 
UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA, GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA 
Lecturer, (part time) College of Business and Public Administration, 1981 – 1985/1992 
– 1995:  
Taught junior and senior levels courses in Public Personnel Administration,  
Public Enterprise Organization and Management, Government Planning and  
Rural Development.  
 
TIALA LAW ASSOCIATES, INC. MONROVIA, LIBERIA 
Attorney-At-Law, 1995 -1996 
Achievements: 
Served as legal counsel and provided advisory services to party litigants; evaluated clients’ 
complaints, reviewed case related documents and records and conducted research to determine 
applicable laws. Prepared briefs, responses to motions and represented clients at trials and 
hearings; conducted legal research and discovery work in association with pending cases; 
interacted with court personnel and officials in association with clients’ cases. 
 
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, GOVRNMENT OF LIBERIA 
Deputy Minister for Administration, 1991 – 1995 
Provided executive leadership in implementation of the national laws, regulations and policies 
governing the transportation sector; direct the provision of administrative services through 
supervision of line functions for effective operations in the provision of services to the public; 
determined, analyzed, and resolved administrative problems in ensuring that functions meet the 
needs of the public;  established effective working relationships with employees and associates; 
collaborated with  officials of other ministries and agencies, and representatives of non-
governmental and international organizations in pursuing specific and general the general 
objectives of the Ministry.  
 
FIVE STAR PARKING, INC., PHILADELPHIA, PA (USA)  
Field Manager, 1988 – 1991 
Supervised operations of assigned parking garages and lots; participated in decisions 
relating to policy changes governing the operations and maintenance of facilities; 
collected revenues generated (in daily excess of $5,000.00) from cashiers and lot 
attendants; prepared daily and monthly financial reports; recruited and trained cashiers 
and parking lot attendants; maintained effective customer relations with clients and the 





UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION/LIBERIA 
Logistics Administrator, 1985 – 1986 
Performed inventory and procurement operations administration work; worked with staff 
to resolve problems and monitored provision of services, equipment and supplies in 
accordance with established guidelines; interacted with local vendors, contractors and 
government officials in coordinating services on behalf of the Mission. 
 
 
PARKER INDUSTRIES, INC. GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA 
Managing Director, 1981 – 1983 
Responsible to direct provision of administrative services necessary for managing the 
operations of the corporation such as management of personnel, maintenance of facility, 
budget preparation, and procurement of raw materials for production; responsible to 
analyze and ascertain the financial status of the corporation, set overall goals and 
priorities, and direct implementation of solutions to problems and issues; direct fiscal 





Bachelor of Laws, Louise Arthur Grimes School of Law, University of Liberia        December 
1985 
 
Master of Public Administration, California State University, Sacramento  January 1980 
 
Master of Arts, (International Affairs) California State University, Sacramento  May 
1980 
 
Bachelor of Arts, (Economics) University of Liberia    December 1976 
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International Personnel Management Association (IPMA), 1998            
 
Liberian Bar Association,    1992 
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